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INTRODUCTION
Anyone who wants to learn how the common law regards
abortion has quite the trove to go through.1 Unsurprising to
find a volume this hefty: the common law goes back a long
way,2 and actions taken to terminate unwanted pregnancies
go back even longer.3 Decisional law has for many centuries
reported claims that individuals extinguished, or attempted
to extinguish, life inside the body of a pregnant woman. Much
of this case law falls in the domain of crimes—that is to say,
prosecution of abortion-furnishers like physicians and
midwives who acted on purpose—but common law courts
have also long adjudicated the ending of prenatal life by
accident: for example, through the careless operation of a cart
or automobile.4
Secondary authorities have also weighed in on the
common law of abortion. Icons like William Blackstone and
Edward Coke described judge-made law of abortion and
shared their views of what it ought to say.5 Legal scholars
continue this application of the common law to abortion into

1. This Article uses “the common law” in an American perspective, meaning
judge-made doctrines that entered the law of the United States from English
antecedents. In ascribing positions and perspectives to the common law, I write
mindful that it has long been opaque, manipulable, and hard to pin down. See
F. Rosen, Introduction to THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, at xxxi, xxxix (J.H.
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (1996) (noting these and
other infirmities that Bentham tried to reform more than two centuries ago).
2. Conventions of legal history site the beginning of the common law in 1066
with the crowning of William the Conqueror. See JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION
OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW, at xi, 21-22 (1996).
3. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 30
(2006) (“Unquestionably abortions were attempted in all human societies and in
all eras.”); Gina Kolata, In Ancient Times, Flowers and Fennel for Family
Planning, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1994, at C10.
4. See generally Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of
Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries
and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1401-07 (reviewing case law from
England, Ireland, and the United States).
5. See id. at 1405-06; see also infra Part IV.
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the current millennium.6 Historians and sociologists who
write about abortion, focusing on legal regulation in general
rather than the common law in particular, take an interest
in the same sources.7
In the United States, state power to regulate abortion is
understood as governed more by constitutional than common
law—but even in constitutional decisional law one finds
secondary material about what the common law provides.
Roe v. Wade,8 the principal Supreme Court decision on
abortion, articulated the right to terminate as a prohibition
on criminalization during the first trimester of pregnancy
rather than anyone’s common law entitlement, finding this
constraint on government action in and around the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.9 To reach this
conclusion Justice Blackmun, in his opinion for the Court,
reviewed an array of non-constitutional precedents,
including treatises on canon law, nineteenth century English
statutes, treatises by Coke and Blackstone and Bracton,
twentieth century case law and statutes from England, and
American receptions of British common law at the state
level.10 Other American judicial authors continue this
primary-secondary hybridization by including in their postRoe rulings a discussion of what the common law had to say
about abortion.11 The secondary literature is voluminous.

6. Most of this scholarship deems the common law opposed to abortion.
See, e.g., DELLAPENNA, supra note 3 (investigating centuries of Anglo-American
abortion regulation, both judicial and statutory); William J. Maledon, Note, The
Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 349 (1971) (reviewing English and American decisions).
7. See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 1317, 137 (1984) (reviewing decisional law as a backdrop for contemporary
sociology); LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE,
AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973 (1997) (providing nineteenth and
twentieth century history).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. See id. at 164.
10. Id. at 116, 133-41.
11. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 550 A.2d 722, 724-26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988);
Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 95-CA-00960-SCT, 716 So. 2d 645, 651 (Miss. 1998).
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An apparently mature corpus, in short. Judicial decisions
and reflections by thoughtful writers have reflected on what
the common law of abortion provides and where it should
change. Alongside this maturity, the common law of abortion
paradoxically is also underdeveloped. Its applications have
not yet gained force. Judges and scholars who built and
described the common law of abortion, I argue in this Article,
have mistaken the periphery for the center.
Their contributions have assigned the starring role of
abortion law to someone whose actions have an impact on the
body of a pregnant woman. For the common law of crimes,
this protagonist is the abortionist.12 Tort law related to
abortion focuses on a defendant who collided with a pregnant
individual.13 Writers who study the common law of abortion
also assign a leading role to what is inside the human body
that experienced impact, an entity whose label changes based
on its gestational stage.
English unfortunately lacks a unitary generic word for
this life-form.14 Instead a succession of nouns—among others
blastocyst, zygote, embryo, and fetus—make reference to
developmental stages and thus link calendrical age with the

12. Though unfortunately pejorative, “abortionist” suits my purpose better
than “abortion provider,” which can be an institution or an intermediary; this
Article has in mind individuals who participate in terminations.
13. Via “pregnant individual” I seek to avoid the question of whether
pregnancy should be perceived as something a man can experience. Compare
THOMAS BEATIE, LABOR OF LOVE: THE STORY OF ONE MAN’S EXTRAORDINARY
PREGNANCY (2008), with Katha Pollitt, Who Has Abortions?, NATION (Mar. 13,
2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/who-has-abortions (“I’m going to argue
here that removing ‘women’ from the language of abortion is a mistake.”).
References to a woman make accurate reference to pregnancy as regulated before
the onset of trans-awareness, and so in discussing the past I will sometimes use
“woman.” Nowhere do I wish to imply that pregnancy is gender-neutral. See
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary
Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 330 n.2 (2010) (stating that
pregnancy is “a female experience because pregnancy and the capacity for
pregnancy are central to the cultural and legal construction of gender”).
14. “Conceptus” appears in some lexicons, but definitions are not uniform.
Some sources understand this term to become obsolete after an embryo
transitions to the fetal stage.
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identity of the unborn.15 This linguistic premise clashes with
the argument of this Article, as the common law does not
divide unborn entities into categories. For want of a better
term I use the neologism Zef, an acronym for zygote-embryofetus.16
At every age and stage, the Zef crosses boundary lines
patrolled by the common law. As an intruder-occupant whose
invasion imposes serious consequences on its host (another
suboptimal noun to which I resort faute de mieux17) and that
cannot be evicted by responses that are less than fatal to it,
such as slight force or verbal orders to leave, a Zef can
lawfully be the target of deadly force.18 Other common law
fields support this justification with reference to individual
interests and prerogatives. So a Zef that is allowed to stay
inside its host thereby receives beneficence, or what tort law
15. This language gap resembles the lack of a male counterpart to “cow” that
forces English speakers to use a narrower word focused on husbandry, or the
wishes of human masters. A male cow castrated for the sake of exploitation after
its death is a “steer;” when the motive for castration is to obtain toil, often the
pulling of a plow, the animal becomes an “ox;” we do have a word for male cattle
left intact, but agrarian agendas ensure that only a rare male domesticated cow
retains the identity of “bull” that he started with. His female counterpart might
lead an unhappy life, but at least the word “cow” references a creature that, like
a person, is an end in itself.
16. See Paul Langham, Between Abortion and Infanticide, 17 S.J. PHIL. 465,
465 (1979) (rendering the term as “ZEF”). Further impeded by deficiency in the
English language, I intend no gratuitous depersonalization when I refer to the
Zef as “it” rather than “he” or “she” and when I call it an entity. Decades ago, a
student author noted this limitation of the English language and chose very
different diction. Maledon, supra note 6, at 350-51 (rejecting “embryo” and “fetus”
because they refer to gestational stages, and using “unborn child”). From the
other side of the abortion binary, I esteem this work for its intellectual honesty
and tireless research, done back when research was harder to do. William
Maledon remained in the abortion debate after he graduated from law school: his
clerkship for Justice Brennan took place during the fateful 1972 Term. CLARKE
D. FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION: THE INSIDE STORY OF ROE V. WADE 271 (2013).
17. “Host” in some contexts implies willingness to extend an etymologicallyrelated offering, hospitality, to an occupant. I use host more broadly to mean
someone harboring an occupant that can be described with multiple nouns,
including parasite and guest.
18. See EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM
CHOICE TO CONSENT (1996) (offering a book-length application of self-defense to
abortion).
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calls “rescue;”19 but the Zef has no legal entitlement to this
favor unless an exception to the rule of no duty governs the
pregnancy. By providing for self-defense and defense of
property in parallel to the criminal law, tort clarifies that the
right to withhold rescue includes the power to take
affirmative steps necessary to effect this decision.20 The body
of a pregnant individual is a locus of property rights that
include possession and dispossession.21 Unjust enrichment, a
venerable common law doctrine, condemns the wrongful
gains of a Zef inside its host when its host does not wish the
pregnancy to continue; the common law of contracts supports
the decision to withhold what another has demanded without
giving anything in exchange.22
Applying these common law doctrines to abortion calls
for willingness to consider the pregnant person a person. The
premise that the common law of abortion also applies to the
pregnant individual herself—not just her hirelings and
handlers and the strangers who run into her; not just the Zef
her body houses—may seem obvious,23 but it has escaped
notice.24 Case law and scholarly commentary alike have
barely considered the common law of abortion from the inside
of a human being. This Article, examining the common law of
abortion from a premise that a pregnant individual holds the
duties and rights that the law ascribes to persons, fills a void.
Part I of this Article reviews the ways in which
pregnancy, whether unwanted or wanted, imposes
19. See infra notes 204-24 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. In the phrasing of William Blackstone, the starting point of “every man’s
person being sacred” means “no other having a right to meddle with it in any the
slightest manner.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120.
24. For a rare exception, see Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional
Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the
Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law
Liberty?, 17 N.Y. L. F. 335, 336 (1971) (adverting to “the long period during which
English and American women enjoyed a common-law liberty to terminate at will
an unwanted pregnancy, from the reign of Edward III to that of George III”); see
also MCDONAGH, supra note 18, at 19 (assessing abortion as the exercise of a
fundamental right).
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unambiguous detriment on a person. Understood with bad
effects in mind—the physical pain, mortality, and morbidity
of pregnancy would suffice even when one puts aside
financial detriments and emotional risks—a state-imposed
prohibition of abortion makes a human being suffer by not
letting her have otherwise attainable relief from hardship.
Any adverse physical, emotional, or financial consequence is
worth enduring when one wants what comes with it, but
detriments of pregnancy are horrifying when the pregnant
person lacks this desire.
The remainder of the Article focuses on the common law.
Part II starts by looking for conditions that the common law
regards as sufficient to explain or justify detriment that the
state chooses to impose. It finds three possibilities, all of
which demand prior voluntary conduct by the individual who
suffers, and concludes that pregnancy fits none of them.
Because nobody deserves to suffer via state action merely for
having a Zef inside of her, there is indeed a “common-law
liberty to terminate at will an unwanted pregnancy,” a
liberty that extends further than its expositor, Cyril Means,
Jr., realized.25
Up until the late eighteenth century, according to Means,
the common law “allowed all women, married or unmarried,
moral or immoral, to terminate their pregnancies at will.”26
Means supported his assertion with reference to the law of
crimes. No common law prosecutions before quickening, he
claimed.27 Right or wrong about the fourth month of
pregnancy as the approximate start of criminalization—the
historical record is contested28—this conclusion neglects the
depth of the liberty Means found. Part III provides a
necessary expansion. The right to reject one’s pregnancy
comes not only from the law of crimes but also tort, property,
contract, and equity. It pervades the entire common law.

25. Means, supra note 24, at 336.
26. Id. at 374-75, 382.
27. See id. passim.
28. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 13-14 (explaining the author’s goal of
“[d]ispelling the [m]yths” propagated by Means).
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The last task of this Article is to take on the challenge
implicit in its claim. If Ye Olde Common Law gives
individuals a right to rid themselves of pregnancy, one would
have expected to hear the news before 2015.29 As the
contemporary pop star Rihanna has asked, where have you
been?30 Part IV offers an answer. Working with evidence
educed mainly by Joseph Dellapenna, I contend that until
recently—no earlier than the late nineteenth century—
abortion was simply too dangerous for a rational actor to
choose for herself. By the time a woman could safely end her
pregnancy and move on, the common law had already taken
form. In addition, as the remainder of Part IV shows, female
individuals historically lacked full access not only to common
law courts but also to condoned self-regard, a central
commitment of the common law. Without condoned selfregard common law rights recede from view, even though
they are always there.
I. ABORTION PROHIBITION = STATE-IMPOSED DETRIMENT
When the state bans abortion, or takes steps to make it
unattainable, pregnant individuals receive an order from the
government: they must endure their condition even if they
find it abhorrent. From there, other experiences are not
certain to occur, but are likely: the individual can expect to
go through childbirth and become a mother to a new person.31
Pregnancy, childbirth, and parenthood can be intensely
desired and pursued, of course.32 An abortion prohibition does

29. A tiny literature does exist. In addition to the remarkable assertion made
by Cyril Means in 1971, see supra note 24, antecedents of my thesis include
MCDONAGH, supra note 18; Susan E. Looper-Friedman, “Keep your Laws Off my
Body”: Abortion Regulation and the Takings Clause, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 253,
275-78 (1995) (locating an abortion right in the common law of property). This
Article goes further, however, in finding the right to terminate unambiguous,
deeply rooted, and pervasive in the common law.
30. Where Have You Been Lyrics, METROLYRICS, http://www.metrolyrics.com/
where-have-you-been-lyrics-rihanna.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
31. On the gender of pregnant persons, see supra note 13.
32. See infra Part I.C.
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not get in the way of a pregnant person who wishes to be
pregnant.33
Unless all pregnant persons fall into the contended or
resigned category, however—and we know they don’t34—
abortion bans amount to a detriment for individuals that is
backed by the police power of the state. Commanding that
someone must remain pregnant against her will makes her
suffer in ways analogous to penalties that governments have
in the past imposed on criminals and some still use:
imprisonment, flogging, torture, surveillance. Forced
childbearing is in some ways more severe than any of these
punishments. Its impact is lifelong. Its hurtful consequences,
which can include severe pain and death, are exceptionally
intimate. It cuts deeper into the invaded person. One cannot,
as Jed Rubenfeld has put the point, “name a single
prohibitory law in our legal system with greater affirmative,
conscriptive, life-occupying effects than those imposed by a
law forcing a woman to bear a child against her will.”35
Because this compulsion can be ended through interventions
that are safe and effective for the person burdened, all
legislation that bans or restricts abortion applies detriment
to persons who are pregnant and do not wish to remain so,
even if prohibitors believe they are merely letting nature take
its course or being kind to a baby.
A. Physical Detriments: Pain, Morbidity, and Mortality
To consider this set of detriments, assume for parity’s
sake that whether she undergoes abortion or parturition, a
pregnant individual receives the best available support to
make a priority of her comfort. Early termination can be done
in two ways, chemically and surgically. The chemical method,
as practiced today, starts with a two-pill sequence with the
33. See Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1582
(1979) (“[T]he question is not whether pregnancy is worthwhile . . . for a woman
who wants a child. The question is how burdensome it is for a woman who does
not want a child.”).
34. See supra note 3 (noting millennia of abortion-desiring human history).
35. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT 225 (2001), quoted in Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion,
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1942 n.146 (2012).
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first pill, mifepristone, taken in a medical office and the
second pill, misoprostol, taken later at home; or surgically,
with an aspiration procedure on a table.36 The abortion-pill
method produces cramps that can be eased with pain pills.37
The surgical method, also used in later-term abortions, is
performed with anesthesia; patients report slight to
moderate pain.38
Slight to moderate pain is not what most individuals who
have given birth report about their experience. “In
quantitative ratings of pain severity,” researchers have
found, “the pain of a first labor exceeds cancer pain by a
considerable margin and falls just shy of the pain of limb
amputation sans anesthesia.”39 Some writers say otherwise,40
and women have reported that the experience of giving birth
gave them more physical pleasure than pain.41 Evidence,
however, indicates that intense pain during the delivery of a
baby is the norm and low-pain birth the exception.42 Some of
the evidence comes from signs of pain shown by nonhuman
animals as they give birth,43 some from what researchers

36. See Beverly Winikoff et al., Two Distinct Oral Routes of Misoprostol in
Mifepristone Medical Abortion: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 112 OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 1303, 1304 (2008).
37. See id.
38. Eliane Bélanger et al., Pain of First-trimester Abortion: A Study of
Psychosocial and Medical Predictors, 36 PAIN 339, 339 (1989).
39. FRANK T. VERTOSICK, JR., WHY WE HURT: THE NATURAL HISTORY
106 (2000).

OF

PAIN

40. The British obstetrician Grantly Dick-Read, for example, argued in the
mid-twentieth century that women about to give birth can gain comfort by
applying themselves to the task. GRANTLY DICK-READ, CHILDBIRTH WITHOUT FEAR
35-36 (4th ed. 1972).
41. NANCY BARDACKE, MINDFUL BIRTHING: TRAINING THE MIND, BODY, AND
HEART FOR CHILDBIRTH AND BEYOND 86-89 (2012); INA MAY GASKIN, INA MAY’S
GUIDE TO CHILDBIRTH 157-60 (2003).
42. WILLIAM CAMANN & KATHRYN J. ALEXANDER, EASY LABOR: EVERY WOMAN’S
GUIDE TO CHOOSING LESS PAIN AND MORE JOY DURING CHILDBIRTH 25-26 (2006)
(noting also that many women believed that the degree of pain associated with
labor had been understated).
43. Forrest Wickman, Is Giving Birth Easier for Other Animals?, SLATE (Sept.
27, 2012, 6:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/explainer/
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describe as anatomical tradeoffs imposed by evolution for a
large human brain.44
Babies emerge through an experience that one (male)
physician calls “terror and violence.”45 The uterus squeezes
hard to expel a fetus, putting pressure on the abdomen, back,
perineum, bladder, and bowels.46 Crowning stretches the
opening of the vagina,47 and what precedes crowning is a
sharp pushing stage described in one metaphor as a “ring of
fire.”48 The alternative to a vaginal delivery, a C-section or
cesarean, slashes the abdomen open with a scalpel and leads
to other sources of pain, catalogued by the What to Expect
When You’re Expecting writers under a rubric of the usual
postpartum symptoms.49 This roster includes but is not
limited to breast engorgement, lochia, postpartum fatigue
and, if extended labor occurred, pain around the perineum.50
Next, mortality and morbidity. Data comparing death
from childbirth with death from abortion became available in
2012. Elizabeth Raymond and David Grimes, two physicians
who reviewed records on both childbirth and abortion during
the years 1998–2005, found that the risk of death from
childbirth was fourteen times greater than the risk of death
from abortion.51 An individual who becomes pregnant in the
2012/09/animals_giving_birth_dolphins_bear_newborns_easily_but_hyenas_risk
_death_.html.
44. VERTOSICK, supra note 39, at 110.
45. Id. at 108 (adding that during childbirth “[t]he vagina and rectum can be
torn irreparably, the pelvic bones separated, the bladder smashed”).
46. Alice Lesch Kelly, The Truth About Labor Pain, FIT PREGNANCY,
http://www.fitpregnancy.com/pregnancy/labor-delivery/truth-about-labor-pain
(last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
47. See VERTOSICK, supra note 39, at 108.
48. CAMANN & ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 30.
49. Delivering by Cesarean Section (C-Section), WHAT TO EXPECT,
http://www.whattoexpect.com/pregnancy/c-section (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
50. Id.
51. Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of
Legal Induced Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 215, 216 (2012). This paper, published in the official journal of the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, received criticism from
writers opposed to abortion rights. Much of it is ad hominem—labeling Raymond
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United States and does not terminate the pregnancy is very
likely to survive the experience even if her pregnancy is
identified as high risk, but ceteris paribus her risk of not
surviving is significantly higher than it would be if she chose
termination, with its mortality rate estimated by the Centers
for Disease Control as .67 deaths per 100,000 abortions.52
Comparisons are pertinent here: abortion is less fatal than
another medical intervention taken for granted as safe
enough, penicillin, with its one fatal reaction in 50–100,000
courses, or Viagra, with a death rate of 5 per 100,000
prescriptions.53 Even aspirin exposure was documented to
cause fifty-four deaths in 2004.54
One harm of pregnancy that bridges the gap between
mortality and morbidity is domestic violence, because this
harm can both kill a person and (merely) lessen her health.
Pregnancy is a well-studied precipitator of intimate
battering.55 A significant minority of pregnant individuals in
the United States experience physical violence, most of it
domestic in nature, “with a resultant fetal demise of 5%.”56

and Grimes pro-choice and the like—but not all. For example, emergency room
coding procedures may fail to record complications of abortion, and the
Guttmacher Institute, still affiliated with Planned Parenthood, provides much of
the current data used for abortion policymaking even though it is a private
organization with a point of view about whether abortion should be legal and
available. See FORSYTHE, supra note 16, at 235-42.
52. KATHA POLLITT, PRO: RECLAIMING ABORTION RIGHTS 135 (2014) (reporting
the mortality rate from abortions for a seven year period from 2003–2009).
53. Id.
54. Peter A. Chyka et al., Salicylate Poisoning: An Evidence-Based Consensus
Guideline for Out-of-Hospital Management, 45 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 95, 96
(2007). Contaminated aspirins and suicides are excluded from this count.
55. Loraine Bacchus et al., Prevalence of Domestic Violence when Midwives
Routinely Enquire in Pregnancy, 111 BJOG 441, 444 (2004).
56. Howard A. Werman & Robert E. Falcone, Trauma in Pregnancy, TRAUMA
REP., July 1, 2008, at 1 (estimating domestic violence victims as “[t]en to thirty
percent” of all “pregnant females”). For a lower estimate, see Donna St. George,
Many New or Expectant Mothers Die Violent Deaths, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2004,
at A20 (“4 percent to 8 percent”). Abortion opponent Clarke Forsythe takes a
different view of the connection. See FORSYTHE, supra note 16, at 322-24 (arguing
that Roe v. Wade has increased male rage and also enables a batterer to pressure
his partner to terminate against her wishes).
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Terminating a pregnancy in contrast to keeping it also
makes a person better off on the morbidity front. Although
no counterpart to the Raymond-Grimes study of mortality
can be done, ill health following pregnancy is too vast and
varied to be catalogued. “For every woman who dies of
pregnancy-related causes,” a World Health Organization
study has observed, “20 or 30 others experience acute or
chronic morbidity, often with permanent sequelae that
undermine their normal functioning.”57
The presence of a Zef strains the body of its host in
numerous ways.58 Occupation by a Zef commandeers the
entire cardiovascular system of a host, causing decreased
blood flow to the lower extremities and thereby disposing
pregnant women to edema, blood-vessel varicosities, and the
more serious complication of thrombophlebitis.59 About 70%
of pregnant women experience increased pigmentation on the
skin of their faces; even more experience bleeding from their
gums or oral pharynx.60 Among the permanent side effects of
pregnancy that occur frequently are weight gain, stretch
marks, pelvic floor disorder (associated with urinary and
rectal incontinence), varicose veins, and the loss of dental and
bone calcium.61 Giving birth to children is linked with a

57. Tabassum Firoz et al., Measuring Maternal Health: Focus on Maternal
Morbidity, 91 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 794, 794 (2013). The report adds that
“non-uniform criteria” confound efforts to measure maternal morbidity. See id.
(noting that studies disagree on basic methodological points such as whether to
include nausea as morbidity and how to cover conditions present before the
pregnancy began).
58. See Regan, supra note 33, at 1574, 1579-82 (using a summary called “The
Physical Burdens of Pregnancy and Childbirth” to argue that the rule of no duty
to rescue, see infra Part III.B, means that pregnant women are entitled to
terminate their pregnancies). Regan relied on a medical text published in 1975,
see Regan, supra note 33, at 1579 n.6, but his catalogue of pain resembles what
current descriptions say.
59. MCDONAGH, supra note 18, at 72.
60. Id.
61. The Effects of Pregnancy, LIZ LIBR., http://www.thelizlibrary.org/siteindex/site-index-frame.html#soulhttp://www.thelizlibrary.org/liz/004.htm
(last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
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higher lifetime risk of Alzheimer’s disease.62 Even one of the
gentlest physical harms is costly: researchers have concluded
that pregnancy-related nausea causes Britain to lose more
than 14 million hours each year of work.63
B. Non-Physical Detriments
Termination has financial as well as physical and
emotional consequences that befall a population likely to lack
money: most pregnancy-terminators are mothers,64 and
financial burdens vex millions of this group in the United
States, where 45% of children live in poor or low-income
households.65 Many such mothers were poor or low-income
before they became pregnant, of course. An individual who
starts out not poor and with no children can expect a
dramatic decline in her income after becoming a mother.66
“The price of motherhood,”67 a phrase coined by journalist
Ann Crittenden, makes reference to lost wage income.
Mothers perform uncompensated childrearing work that one
study priced at $508,700 a year.68 That this labor generates
62. Monica Colucci et al., The Number of Pregnancies is a Risk Factor for
Alzheimer’s Disease, 13 EUR. J. NEUROLOGY 1374, 1376 (2006). Giving birth to
even one child is enough to raise the risk of Alzheimer’s. See id.
63. Roger Gadsby et al., A Prospective Study of Nausea and Vomiting During
Pregnancy, 43 BRIT. J. GEN. PRAC. 245, 248 (1993).
64. RACHEL K. JONES ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., CHARACTERISTICS
ABORTION PATIENTS, 2008, at 8 (2010).

OF

U.S.

65. SOPHIA ADDY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, BASIC FACTS
ABOUT LOW-INCOME CHILDREN: CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS, 2011, at 1 (2013).
“Poor” in this study means income of $18,530 or less for a family of three; “low
income,” which meets only basic needs, means income of $37,060 for a family of
three. Id. at 1-2.
66. Anyone inclined to condemn as greedy or selfish a person who chooses
abortion for financial reasons ought to recall that homo economicus, the construct
that understands human beings as rational maximizer of their own wealth,
pervades American law generally, not just the common law.
67. ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT
JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (2001).
68. The method of this study was to add up the median pay of seventeen
occupations into which mother-work can be classified. Id. at 8. A more
conservative count would value this labor at an annual salary of about
$100,000. Id.
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no salary helps to explain why women remain poorer than
men even though they work more hours a day than men
almost everywhere in the world,69 and even though the law of
many nations, including the United States, forbids pay
discrimination on the basis of sex. A pregnant individual
committed to choosing between retention and termination as
homo economicus would include not only the $241,080 price
tag for the future child’s expenses70 but also the societal
expectation, if not the overt demand, that she toil through
years of long hours for no pay.
Then comes work in the paid sector, where the detriment
of becoming a mother amounts to a wage penalty of seven
percent per child.71 According to The Price of Motherhood, a
college graduate forfeits a million dollars of earnings over her
lifetime as a consequence of this status.72 Subsequent
research has compared the results of job applications from
pairs of candidates identical in all respects except parental
status.73 Men received no penalty, and sometimes benefited,
when they were identified as fathers.74 Women identified as
mothers were penalized in several ways, including perceived
competence and starting salary.75
C. Offsets: A Few Benefits of Remaining Pregnant
For many individuals, remaining pregnant is well worth
the costs reviewed in this Part. We may infer as much from a
single data point: as of 2010, most women in the United
States aged 15 to 50—the majority is slim, about 53%—have

69. Id. at 8-9.
70. Kevin Concannon, What Does It Cost to Raise a Child?, USDA BLOG (Aug.
14, 2013, 2:34 PM), http://blogs.usda.gov/2013/08/14/what-does-it-cost-to-raise-achild.
71. Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66
AM. SOC. REV. 204, 219 (2001).
72. CRITTENDEN, supra note 67, at 88.
73. Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112
AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1309-10 (2007).
74. Id. at 1321.
75. Id. at 1321, 1326.
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had at least one child.76 All these women came of age when
contraception and abortion were legal, even if they had
limited access to these goods,77 and some fraction of the
nulliparous 47% must have at least lamented, if not fought,
infertility.78 This much arithmetic suggests that the majority
of American women prefer to carry at least one pregnancy to
term over their lifetimes.
Keeping rather than terminating a pregnancy furnishes
an individual with physical benefits, not just detriments.
Hormone shifts associated with full-term pregnancy reduce
lifetime risks of developing particular cancers—multiple
pregnancies are more protective than one—and lessen the
incidence and severity of menstrual cramps after the
pregnant person gives birth.79 Whereas physicians once
advised women with multiple sclerosis not to become
pregnant, pregnancy may make relapses less likely, and one
study found that carrying a pregnancy to term reduces the
risk of developing this disease.80 Increased pelvic blood flow
has been credited for “stellar” second-trimester sex.81 For
many female smokers, becoming pregnant is a reason to try
to give up their habit. Not all try—some fail; some “conceal
or underreport their smoking behavior” when researchers

76. Profile America Facts for Features: Mother’s Day: May 13, 2012, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 19, 2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/
cb12ff-08_mothersday.pdf.
77. Because of poverty, for instance, or because they spent their teen years
outside the United States or in geographically disadvantaged regions.
78. The CDC estimates that 12% of women ages fifteen to forty-four “have
difficulty getting pregnant or carrying a pregnancy to term.” Infertility FAQs,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductive
health/Infertility/#a (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
79. Sarah McCraw Crow, 6 Surprising Benefits of Pregnancy, AM. BABY,
http://www.parents.com/pregnancy/my-body/changing/benefits-of-pregnancy
(last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
80. A.-L. Posonby et al., Offspring Number, Pregnancy, and Risk of a First
Clinical Dymyelinating Event, 78 NEUROLOGY 867 (2012); Health Benefits of
Pregnancy and Motherhood, http://www.whattoexpect.com/first-year/photogallery/health-benefits-of-pregnancy-and-motherhood.aspx#/slide-6 (last visited
Sept. 13, 2015).
81. Crow, supra note 79.
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ask82—but pregnancy remains a powerful engine for an
important public health initiative;83 and quitting smoking, for
an individual, means more expected years of life.84
Emotional and psychological upsides to remaining
pregnant can be more extensive. Although it is possible for a
woman to become a parent by other means, pregnancy is the
standard route to motherhood, and motherhood delivers
unique joys at least some of the time. Becoming a parent
through pregnancy is different from—and may feel stronger
than—both motherhood by adoption and fatherhood because
of the singular physical connection between the child and the
person who knew the child intimately from his or her genesis.
Carrying a pregnancy to term can become an occasion of
justified pride.
Another emotional benefit of remaining pregnant,
though darker, has force: termination means stigma.85 When
one politician published a memoir that reported her two
abortions, for example, she explained extreme circumstances
behind her decisions.86 Supreme Court decisional law also
depicts abortion as a grim choice: termination-choosers are
likely to face regrets, wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy for the
Court in Gonzales v. Carhart.87 Hollywood notoriously
82. C. Tracy Orleans et al., Helping Pregnant Smokers Quit: Meeting the
Challenge in the Next Decade, 174 W. J. MED. 276, 276-77 (2001).
83. See id. at 277.
84. Tobacco-Related Mortality, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/health_effects/tobacco_rel
ated_mortality (last updated Aug. 18, 2015).
85. In her first of many bestselling books about etiquette, pro-choice Judith
Martin noted the normative demands of this stigma: “Miss Manners firmly
believes that there are certain honest, understandable, deeply felt emotions that
ought never to be expressed by anyone. First among them is that one does not
want a child one is going to have.” JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNERS’ GUIDE TO
EXCRUCIATINGLY CORRECT BEHAVIOR 19 (1982).
86. WENDY DAVIS, FORGETTING TO BE AFRAID 172-79 (2014). The first of the
terminated pregnancies was ectopic and threatened Davis’s life; the second
abortion killed a fetus doomed to die. Id.
87. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132, 159 (2007). Moreover, officious
strangers have a First Amendment right to get close to them against their will
and try to talk them out of terminating, said McCullen v. Coakley, even though
meddlers must refrain from approaching other strangers to argue with them
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resolves most of its abortion narratives with contrivances
that preempt the procedure.88 Here, shame creates another
benefit to remaining pregnant rather than choosing
termination, no less real from being socially constructed.
All that said, benefits outweigh costs only if one wishes
the first-time parenthood or the larger family that will follow
this pregnancy—or, for the minority of pregnancies that
involve surrogacy, if the pregnant person is receiving
acceptable compensation. Only desire can make the gains of
remaining pregnant greater than the detriments.89 From
here, whenever the government forbids or significantly limits
the delivery of any therapeutic intervention, this exercise of
state power burdens the individual deprived. The Supreme
Court has said as much with respect to abortion,90 and its
decisional law on a variety of other prohibitions agrees.91
about their behaviors and plans. 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2536, 2541 (2014). The National
Organization for Women has suggested to the Chief Justice of the United States
that because “what is good for the goose is good for the gander,” he ought to take
down the 100-foot buffer zone that protects him from being bothered on his way
into a building. Statement of NOW President Terry O’Neill, Roberts’ Court
Enables Violence at Abortion Clinics; NOW calls on Chief Justice to Take Down
his Own Buffer Zone, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN (June 16, 2014), http://now.org/
media-center/press-release/roberts-court-enables-violence-at-abortion-clinics.
88. Mireya Navarro, On Abortion, Hollywood is No-Choice, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2007, § 9 (Magazine), at 1 (noting the custom of feature films not even to
mention the word when a protagonist experiences unplanned or inconvenient
pregnancy).
89. See Regan, supra note 33, at 1582 (contending that “pains and discomforts”
feel worse during unwanted pregnancies).
90. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (“The
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy . . . is a rule of law and a component of
liberty we cannot renounce.”).
91. Regardless of whether litigants who complain about being deprived of
therapies win or lose, the Court acknowledges that their deprivation amounts to
a real injury. Compare Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 539 (1979) (holding that
pretrial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care and that
the withholding of this care constitutes punishment), with Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (concluding that although the federal Controlled Substances Act
outranks state laws permitting therapeutic uses of marijuana, patients might
have a “medical necessity defense”). See also United States v. Rutherford, 442
U.S. 544, 552, 558 (1979) (refusing to recognize a terminal-illness exception to the
legal rule that prescription drugs must be safe and effective while also noting that
the unapproved substance desired by plaintiffs, Laetrile, “may ultimately prove
safe and effective for cancer treatment”).
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II. PRIOR VOLUNTARY CONDUCT NEEDED
BEFORE THE STATE MAY IMPOSE DETRIMENT:
THREE COMMON LAW POSSIBILITIES DISPATCHED
Governments force detriments on individuals all the
time. They lock people up; they impose penalties that can
include fines, prison terms, and death; they enter judgments
against civil litigants and criminal defendants who have lost
in court; they garnish bank accounts; they take away assets
through civil forfeiture; they tell creditors that they must
accept pennies on the dollar. One could read the Bill of Rights
as a recitation of oppressions that the state would try to
inflict if it could (otherwise, why bother to amend the
Constitution?): impinge on religious freedoms, take away
firearms, compel the quartering of soldiers in citizens’ homes,
and so on. Although state-imposed detriments befall
individuals every day, how and when the state may impose
them is limited by constraints that originate in the common
law as well as the Constitution.
The common law offers three possibilities that permit the
imposition of detriment by the state. Each requires prior
voluntary conduct of a particular stripe. First is consent.
Integral everywhere in the common law, consent obliges an
individual to endure a detriment because she said yes to it
before it occurred. A second and related common law
category, found in non-criminal doctrines including contracts
and torts, is an undertaking by the burdened individual.
Whereas consent means acceptance of the very thing or
condition that the individual complains of—a prizefighter
says yes to a punch aimed at his head; a land possessor
invites a visitor and then objects to her presence—an
undertaking, when enforced on an obligor by the common
law, means having volunteered for an obligation that must
be fulfilled or paid for even if it comes to feel unwelcome or
oppressive. Finally, the state may impose detriment
deliberately, as punishment in response to the antisocial
conduct of a wrongdoer.
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A. Consent
Members of our species have been known to welcome
demanding house guests,92 a slap on the face,93 the slash of a
surgical incision,94 and the infliction of pain or bondage on
our bodies.95 We might crave penetration of our intimate
orifices, even risky types of penetration. We can be
penetrators or aggressors ourselves. To manage our entries
into the geography of another person in a respectful way and
have our boundaries crossed on our own terms, the common
law precept of consent has long been at hand.96
Consent is present in every common law field. It
insulates aggressors from criminal and civil liability for
many of the blows, intrusions, and demands they inflict on
volunteers. Volenti, as a great common law judge famously
wrote, non fit injuria.97 One might read this Latin to say prochoice. A detriment that one accepts in advance is not a
detriment at all.
92. Harry L. Levy, The Odyssean Suitors and the Host-Guest Relationship, 94
TRANSACTIONS & PROC. AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS’N 145, 147 (1963) (discussing
forbearance toward burdensome house guests in the Odyssey).
93. A television commercial for Mennen aftershave, airing around the time Roe
v. Wade came down, featured a brisk slap along with “Thanks! I needed that!”
from the man whose face lay at the receiving end. D HEINE, Circa 1973–1974
Mennen Skin Bracer TV Commercial, YOUTUBE (Feb. 13, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEtcHdDyEvo.
94. The year 2012 saw more than a million of the American top-five cosmetic
surgeries—breast augmentation, nose reshaping, eyelid surgery, liposuction, and
facelifts. 14.6 Million Cosmetic Plastic Surgery Procedures Performed in 2012, AM.
SOC’Y PLASTIC SURGEONS (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.plasticsurgery.org/
news/past-press-releases/2013-archives/14-million-cosmetic-plastic-surgeryprocedures-performed-in-2012.html. On the intersection of surgery and the
common law, see JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL.,TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND
REDRESS 644-46 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing express consent).
95. Andreas A.J. Wismeijer & Marcel A.L.M. van Assen, Psychological
Characteristics of BDSM Practitioners, 10 J. SEXUAL MED. 1943, 1943-44 (2013)
(reporting positive mental health associated with this practice).
96. Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (adverting to a common
law right of “[t]he preservation of a man’s health from such practices as may
prejudice or annoy it”).
97. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929)
(Cardozo, J.) (meaning to the willing, there is no injury).
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The common law realm where agreement and acceptance
are most fundamental is contracts. In his monograph about
the centrality of Lord Mansfield to the development of
modern common law,98 James Oldham pays particular heed
to this field. English contract law contained little theory or
predictability when Mansfield took the bench.99 Pressing
“basic fairness and the intentions of the parties as governing
principles,” Mansfield interpreted contracts with an eye to
learning what those who agreed to them wanted.100 The core
of an agreement, he maintained, is acceptance.101
Manifestations like consideration or a signature are tools for
the court to learn about that acceptance rather than ends in
themselves.102 Consent as central to contract means that
common law courts should uphold—and indeed they do
uphold—unwise agreements, economically inefficient
agreements, and agreements that look like bad deals to an
outsider. Randy Barnett defines what he calls his “consent
theory of contract” in both normative and descriptive
terms.103 Consent, he writes, makes a contract both
enforceable in court and deserving of enforcement.104
Next, torts. Volenti non fit injuria, though applicable
elsewhere in the common law, gets mentioned with reference
to torts in particular. Courts use the volenti maxim to mean
assumption of risk when the harm happened by accident, and
consent when the plaintiff has brought an intentional tort
action.105 Consent makes the plaintiff responsible for the
98. JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD (2004).
Mansfield was chief justice of the Court of the King’s Bench from 1756 to 1788.
See id. at 8-9, 11.
99. See id. at 79.
100. See id. at 79, 84-85.
101. See id. at 84-86.
102. See id.
103. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986).
104. Id. at 305.
105. See Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 726 A.2d 172, 179 & n.2
(D.C. 1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 A, to observe that
distinctions between volenti non fit injuria and assumption of the risk are “of
terminology only, and the rules applied are the same in either case”).
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harm to himself that he complains of, on the ground that he
agreed in advance. Agreed, that is, either to accept what he
suffered (for an intentional tort claim) or the risk that he
would suffer harm (for negligence).
Formed and articulated by common law courts to guide
claims for harm attributed to therapeutic treatment
decisions,106 the doctrine of informed consent covers both
negligence and the intentional tort of battery.107 The Supreme
Court, again playing the role of secondary source about the
common law,108 said in 1990 that “the common-law doctrine
of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the
right of a competent individual to refuse medical
treatment.”109 Informed consent extends to acceptances as
well as refusals of medical interventions. One review of
decisional law from several common law jurisdictions found
that courts have “upheld the rule that unless the
circumstances of emergency apply, a medical or surgical
procedure that goes beyond the scope of a patient’s express
consent should be regarded as trespass”—the quintessential
common law wrong—“even when there was no evidence of an
express prohibition.”110
Although battery occupies the large share of attention to
consent as it functions in tort law, consent can be applied to
any common law tort claim.111 One state supreme court
recently relied entirely on common law reasoning to hold that
lack of consent is part of the prima facie case for the tort of

106. JERRY MENIKOFF, LAW AND BIOETHICS 157 (2001).
107. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 242 (2000).
108. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roe v. Wade
and the role of common law values in the Court’s opinion.
109. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
110. Danuta Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of
Concepts of Consent to, and Refusal of, Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass,
17 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 31 (1996).
111. Willey v. Carpenter, 23 A. 630, 631 (Vt. 1892) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 163 (1879) (“Consent is generally a full and
perfect shield when that is complained of as a civil injury which was consented
to.”)).
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trespass to land, rather than an affirmative defense.112 In
other words, consent is so central to the tort that the plaintiff
itself must labor to show its absence at the time that the
invasion to land occurred at the pain of getting the action
dismissed. Other courts have shared the view that consent is
central to claims of trespass to land;113 they have applied it
also to conversion,114 trespass to chattels,115 and false
imprisonment.116
On to the common law of crimes. Consent makes “moral
magic,” writes philosopher Heidi Hurd, in that actions that
the criminal law deems odious become benign when the
person at the receiving end consented to them.117 Similar to
the common law of torts, the common law of crimes also
understands consent as vitiating the aggressor’s
responsibility for actions that inflict harm.118 The importance
112. See Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C. v. FPL Farming Ltd., 457 S.W.3d 414,
423-24 (Tex. 2015).
113. See, e.g., Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 10 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1015
(W.D. Mo. 2014) (holding that consent to an easement for electric power lines did
not include consent to using the easement for telecommunications); Grygiel v.
Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc., 787 N.W.2d 6, 18 (Wis. 2010).
114. Maples v. United Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 686 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
115. Buchanan Marine, Inc. v. McCormack Sand Co., 743 F. Supp. 139, 141
(E.D.N.Y. 1990).
116. Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 404 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C.
1979).
117. Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121, 123
(1996). For partial disagreement with Hurd, suggesting that the reference to
“magic” is overstated, see Michelle Madden Dempsey, Victimless Conduct and the
Volenti Maxim: How Consent Works, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 11, 12 (2012).
118. Because the common law of crimes has no conception of victim standing,
however, criminal law is freer than tort to ignore acceptance of the action by the
person whom it hurt. See MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY, PROSECUTING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 185-89 (2009) (providing a hypothetical in
which the victim’s acceptance of abuse is overshadowed by the community’s
intervention on her behalf). Thus, the common law of crimes usually declines to
consider consent in murder prosecutions, see, e.g., State v. Fuller, 278 N.W.2d
756, 761 (Neb. 1979) (quoting Turner v. State, 108 S.W. 1139, 1141 (Tenn. 1908),
that “[m]urder is no less murder because the homicide is committed at the desire
of the victim”), and the common law holds that suicide is a crime, though most
contemporary legislatures disagree. Thomas J. Marzen, “Out, Out Brief Candle”:
Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally Ill, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
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of consent in the law of contracts, torts, and crimes, in sum,
shows that consent is foundational to the common law. At the
same time, the common law uses care in its applications of
consent. Foremost, it does not presume that consent is
present.
In 2012, a politician provided a helpful lesson on how
presuming consent to be pregnant cannot justify abortion
prohibitions. During his campaign to move from the House of
Representatives to the Senate, Todd Akin suggested that
bans on abortion need no rape exception because pregnancy
of itself implies acceptance.119 According to Akin, a “female
body” that does not wish to provide gestation following rape
“has ways to try to shut the whole thing down.”120 Regarding
physiology, Akin’s statement was wrong. Pregnancy occurs
with and without willingness to house and feed anyone.121 If
pregnancy of itself proved that the pregnant individual
consented, then a common law rationale to compel gestation
and childbirth could take form. But pregnancy provides no
such proof.
Assumption of risk to support the prohibition of abortion
is a bit more plausible as a variation on consent, though it is
L.Q. 799, 804 (1994). Prosecutions of individuals who inflicted bodily harm during
sadomasochistic encounters have resulted in both convictions and acquittals in
the United States and the United Kingdom. See Cheryl Hanna, Sex is Not a Sport:
Consent and Violence in Criminal Law, 42 B.C. L. REV. 239 (2001) (reviewing
cases and arguing that courts should not accept consent as a defense when harms
are severe). Nevertheless consent of the victim or putative victim suffices to
extinguish responsibility for a host of crimes. See, e.g., Aldrich v. People, 79 N.E.
964, 965 (Ill. 1906) (providing that consent is a defense for larceny); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.13 at 466-67
(1986) (noting the role of non-consent in burglary).
119. Jonathan Weisman & John Eligon, G.O.P. is Pressing Candidate to Quit
Over Rape Remark, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, at A1.
120. Lori Moore, The Statement and the Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, at
A13. Akin later stood by what he said, though he added that the quotation was
misleading because he had also said that “ways to try to shut that whole thing
down” following “legitimate rape” can fail. TODD AKIN, FIRING BACK: TAKING ON
THE PARTY BOSSES AND MEDIA ELITE TO PROTECT OUR FAITH AND FREEDOM 10-11
(2014).
121. See Pam Belluck, Health Experts Dismiss Assertions on Rape, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2012, at A13 (assembling evidence from interviewed experts and peerreviewed research).
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also unavailing. The idea here is that the pregnant person
knew and accepted the risk of pregnancy associated with her
conduct and thus may be forced to accept what befell her as
the consequence of her gamble. Assumption of risk fails
because it requires knowledge and voluntariness.122 Neither
knowledge nor voluntariness can be inferred from an act of
sexual intercourse in the recent past, even though many
(possibly even most) persons who experience penetration of
their vaginas by penises know that this action can generate
a risk of pregnancy, and some fraction of those who
understand this risk agree to it.
Regarding the knowledge element, pregnancy can occur
when the person who is pregnant relied on a trustworthy
contraceptive that failed; reasonably believed assurances
about the infertility of her partner or herself; or otherwise
acted prudently to reduce the likelihood of conceiving.
Conception is not especially likely to result from sex even
without contraception if one counts all pregnancies as the
numerator and all acts of vaginal intercourse as the
denominator of the same fraction.123 As for voluntariness,
putting aside the inaccuracy of “legitimate rape” as asserted
by Representative Akin,124 it is often absent even when the
penetrated person manifested enough acquiescence to thwart
a rape prosecution. “[T]he set of nonconsensual acts,” as
Andrew Koppelman has put the point, “is considerably larger
than the set of deeds that produce criminal convictions.”125
B.

Undertaking

The second common law opportunity to impose detriment
on an individual comes from the undertaking she or he may
122. See DOBBS, supra note 107, at 535 (stating elements of assumption of risk).
123. See MCDONAGH, supra note 18, at 52 (noting that “for all but six days of a
woman’s ovulatory cycle, the probability is zero that conception will follow sexual
intercourse”); see also id. at 57 (arguing that what causes pregnancy is not “sexual
intercourse” but a fertilized ovum). A newer book rates the odds of a presumedfertile woman’s becoming pregnant from a single act of unprotected sexual
intercourse as 1 in 20. MICHAEL BLASTLAND & DAVID SPIEGELHALTER, THE NORM
CHRONICLES 82 (2014).
124. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
125. Koppelman, supra note 35, at 1943-44.
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have made. Express contracts, contracts implied in law, and
contracts implied in fact all posit that courts may hold a
promisor to the terms of what he agreed he would do. Randy
Barnett’s understanding of assent as a source of moral as
well as legal obligation in the law of contracts, noted above
with reference to the related common law concept of
consent,126 applies to undertaking too. Barnett observes that
“a promisor incurs a contractual obligation the legal
enforcement of which is morally justifiable by manifesting
assent to legal enforcement and thereby invoking the
institution of contract.”127
As the common law scholar Joseph Henry Beale noted
more than a century ago, the law of undertakings partakes of
contract and tort. An undertaking fails to be a contract, on
the one hand, when consideration is absent, but is also not a
source of tort liability, on the other, in that tort liability lands
on individuals regardless of whether they volunteered.128
“One has only to be born or to immigrate into a society, in
order to undergo the [tort] duty of respecting the persons and
property of his neighbors,” Beale wrote, “but in order to be
required to exercise the active care required of an
undertaker, the obligor must ‘take the trust upon himself.’”129
Undertakings arise with forethought and are manifested
by behaviors. A drowning person catches attention from a
swimmer or the Coast Guard,130 for example; a sorority leader
signs up as “guardian angel” to keep an eye out for perils that
a freshman rush-week pledge.131 The common law does not
leap to find undertakings in the absence of evidence that they
occurred. Losing cases abound for plaintiffs who had hoped
that defendants had undertaken to engage in conduct useful

126. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
127. Barnett, supra note 103, at 305.
128. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 HARV. L. REV. 222, 222
(1892).
129. Id. at 224.
130. See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 112 (5th ed. 2013).
131. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 987 P.2d 300, 305 (Idaho 1999).
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to them.132 Indeed, the entire category would dissolve if courts
presumed an undertaking to exist whenever a needy
claimant could have benefited from kindness from someone
else. Because pregnancy can befall a person who did nothing
except become inseminated, courts have no reason to infer
from pregnancy alone that a pregnant individual committed
herself to do anything for anyone. “[T]he obligor must ‘take
the trust upon himself’” (or herself) before the law will impose
obligation.133
Even if one were willing to infer an undertaking to
remain pregnant from the fact of pregnancy itself, common
law precepts provide that the obligor may abandon this
undertaking when fulfilling it would demand too much of her.
Contracts scholar Anthony Kronman describes this
imperative as a “prohibition against self-enslavement.”134
Certain classes of agreements whose formation fulfills all the
checklist elements for validity become unenforceable as
inconsistent with freedom itself.
Gathering examples of forbidden waivers that look alike
to him in this respect, Kronman defines self-enslavement
inductively. Courts, he observes, do not permit promisors to
waive their right “to engage in a particular profession, obtain
a discharge in bankruptcy, initiate a divorce action, or breach
a contract of employment and substitute money damages for

132. See Udy v. Custer Cty., 34 P.3d 1069, 1073 (Idaho 2001) (“[P]ast voluntary
acts do not entitle the benefited party to expect assistance on future occasions, at
least in the absence of an express promise that future assistance will be
forthcoming.”); Folsom v. Burger King, 958 P.2d 301, 311 (Wash. 1998) (refusing
to interpret an expired contract as creating a voluntary undertaking, even though
the defendant had left its security equipment on the plaintiff’s premises and this
behavior looked like an expression of willingness to continue the old obligation);
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS
41-42 (1998) (noting the law’s disinclination to enforce undertakings absent
reasonable reliance by the claimant); Dan B. Dobbs, Undertakings and Special
Relationships in Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 49, 57 (2008) (“Significant limitations accompany liability for
undertakings.”).
133. Beale, supra note 128, at 224.
134. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J.
763, 775 (1983).
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the promised performance.”135 What unites these stances
about waiver is a position that anyone “who would give away
too much of his own liberty must be protected from
himself[.]”136 If the promises that an individual might have
made to eschew divorce, bankruptcy protection, or a
particular occupation are unenforceable because her freedom
to choose these options is too precious to give away, then
whatever promise she might have made to endure the severe
detriments of unwanted pregnancy and unwanted
motherhood (it bears repetition that no such promise can be
inferred from an episode of sexual intercourse137) must be
unenforceable for the same reason.
Related concern for liberty emerges at the level of
remedy, where American contract doctrine limits what
victors can receive. Courts can agree that a contract is valid
and that it was breached but refuse to give a litigant the
performance she wants: they restrict her recourse to
monetary damages. Some promisees do receive specific
performance,138 but confining redress to money is the default
in the event of a breach.139 The withholding of specific
performance under the law of contracts emphasizes the
common law’s disinclination to burden individuals with
conditions that they find difficult to tolerate, unless some
voluntary action of theirs earned them this fate.
C. Crime and Punishment
A final possibility that might permit a ban on abortion as
state-imposed detriment comes from the common law of
crimes. Common law supports and enables the rendering of
criminal penalties much worse than unwanted pregnancy
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
138. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999) (allowing
specific performance of contracts for the sale of goods when the goods are unique,
“or in other proper circumstances”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).
139. Ben Depoorter & Stephan Tontrup, How Law Frames Moral Intuitions: The
Expressive Effect of Specific Performance, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 673, 682 (2012).
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and its sequelae. Detriments for prior voluntary behavior
that common law courts have found acceptable range from
slight inconvenience to a violent death at the hands of the
state.
The common law cannot, however, tolerate the
imposition of gestation, parturition, and unwanted
parenthood as a penalty. States that seek to codify a
categorical criminal ban on abortion of the kind found on the
law books in Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Kuwait,
Poland, Ireland, and dozens of other countries gain no
support for such codification from the common law.140
Becoming pregnant is inherently not a common law crime
because the common law imposes two defining elements that
pregnancy, without more, does not fulfill: actus reus and
mens rea.
Translatable as culpable act and culpable mental state
respectively,141 the two elements demand that the pregnant
person have engaged in conduct condemned by the law while
aware of the nature of what she was doing.142 Because an
individual can be impregnated when she is asleep, comatose,
or made unconscious by drugs, the fact of her pregnancy does
not demonstrate any self-awareness on her part, and the
common law insists on consciousness when deeming an
individual criminally culpable.143 Mens rea is even more
dramatically absent in impregnation for the same reason:
even if one deems the reception of semen into one’s body to
be an act, which seems a stretch, a person can become
140. See
Abortion
Laws
Worldwide,
WOMEN
ON
WAVES,
http://www.womenonwaves.org/en/page/460/abortion-laws-worldwide
(last
visited Sept. 1, 2015) (gathering examples of laws found around the world that
prohibit abortion either without exception, or permit it only to save the life of the
individual who is pregnant).
141. The common law jurist Sir Edward Coke put this point as “actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea,” approximately “an act does not make for guilt unless the
mind of the actor be guilty.” 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
54 (London, M. Flesher 1644).
142. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1960).

OF

CRIMINAL LAW 177-78 (2d ed.

143. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and
Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269 (2002) (summarizing common law
precursors to the Model Penal Code and contemporary American legislation).
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pregnant with no mental participation in what has happened
to her.144
Even if a pregnant individual did something that
warrants punishment, the penalty here—again, gestation
followed by severe physical pain followed by unwanted
parenthood—does not align with any rational penal objective
that a state might pursue. Rationales of punishment in
Anglo-American law divide into retribution and
consequentialism.145 In other words, the reasons to punish an
offender that make sense to the common law are (only) two;
either the offender earned by her past conduct the suffering
that the punishment imposes, or the imposition of a penalty
will deter misconduct in the future. Neither of the two
rationales for punishment accords with a ban on abortion.
Forced gestation, parturition, and motherhood are
incoherent retribution for whatever misconduct the
pregnancy
is
understood
to
manifest.
As
for
consequentialism, even if severe punishments of the
pregnant individual benefit the Zef, and it is not certain that
they do,146 these penalties also impose harms on entire
societies that might not have done anything deterrable. Nor
have societies earned suffering.

144. Sexual intercourse can take place without awareness that it is occurring;
without awareness of the association between it and the risk of pregnancy; and
without awareness of how difficult it is to undo or reverse the implantation of a
fertilized ovum.
145. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just”
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 852-65 (2002) (reviewing and comparing
retribution and consequentialism).
146. Bans on abortion benefit a Zef only if (1) they reduce the chance that a
pregnant person will choose abortion, an effect to which I am willing to stipulate
arguendo, and (2) being extinguished in an abortion imposes a detriment on a Zef
that is greater in magnitude than the detriment, from its perspective, of being
born against the will of the person who is pregnant. Abortion prohibitors may
suppose that of course every Zef wishes to remain alive inside a human body until
it is ready to leave even when the person housing it wants the pregnancy to cease,
but this belief may be mistaken. See Lynn Beisner, I Wish my Mother had Aborted
Me, ROLE REBOOT (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.rolereboot.org/culture-andpolitics/details/2012-08-i-wish-my-mother-had-aborted-me (“Even given the
happiness and success I now enjoy, if I could go back in time and make the choice
for my mother, it would be abortion.”).
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III. COMMON LAW RIGHTS AND DOCTRINES PERTINENT TO
ABORTION
The doctrines on point are numerous; they are arranged
here around two broad common law precepts about freedom.
A. One May Repel an Invader with Deadly Force
The common law has long maintained that the
intentional killing of another person can constitute an
acceptable response to circumstances.147 More than merely
excused, this homicide is justified.148 Intentional termination
of pregnancy falls within not only self-defense but related
privileges that include defense of others and defense of
habitation, or the castle metaphor that defends domination
over one’s intimate environment and property.
As we will presently see, other doctrines in the common
law align with what self-defense teaches when they conclude
that a host need not do favors for a Zef or provide it with what
amounts to free room and board.149 Self-defense goes
especially far in support of abortion, however, because even
if abortion is understood as the deliberate kind of homicide—
more directly harmful than mere indifference or
disinclination to sacrifice—this privilege still approves of it.
Self-defense is also unique among the common law doctrines
that underlie the legal right to terminate because it offers
justification to furnishers of abortions as well as persons who
take action to cease being pregnant themselves. Accordingly
it is the most powerful constituent of the common law defense
of abortion. Five stances, or precepts, present in the law of
self-defense combine to support a common law right to end a
pregnancy.

147. “Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from
ancient times to the present day.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767
(2010). The Court also noted that “[c]iting Jewish, Greek, and Roman law,
Blackstone wrote that if a person killed an attacker, ‘the slayer is in no kind of
fault whatsoever.’” Id. at 767 n.15 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *182).
148. See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
149. See infra Part III.B.
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The first precept is that persons have an interest in the
integrity and safety of not only their lives and health but the
physical space in which they live. One contribution of this
first point about self-defense is that it answers a favorite
slippery-slope challenge to the asserted right to terminate
pregnancy: If we let you kill your Zef, then where does that
right stop? Do we have to let you kill your baby, toddler,
preteen, and any other dependent you don’t value?
The slope turns out not slippery at all. Only invasion
from within one’s body threatens the life and health and
habitation of a person. Some statements of the privilege say
that an individual who chooses to kill an invader must
reasonably believe that the invader threatens her with
imminent death or serious bodily harm.150 Such a belief is
reasonable in support of killing a Zef, as a tour through the
bodily harms and the risk of death occasioned by pregnancy
will confirm.151 The Zef-threat is “imminent”152: occupancy has
occurred now, and thus the state of being pregnant imposes
its danger now.153 Most individuals who become pregnant
survive their pregnancy, so the risk of death that the Zef
presents is typically not high,154 but self-defense has never set
150. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. Cf. Ashley D. Brosius, Note, An Iowa Law in Need of Imminent Change:
Redefining the Temporal Proximity of Force to Account for Victims of Intimate
Partner Violence Who Kill in Non-Confrontational Self-Defense, 100 IOWA L. REV.
775, 790-92 (2015) (analyzing the imminence requirement of self-defense in the
context of intimate partner violence).
153. Some writers disagree. See, e.g., LAURIE SHRAGE, ABORTION AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: DEPOLARIZING THE DEBATE 69 (2003) (stating that “most
abortions are not urgent”); Robin West, Liberalism and Abortion, 87 GEO. L.J.
2117, 2127 (1999) (asserting that “pregnancy, even when nonconsensual, does not
typically threaten death, lasting bodily injury, or even an immediate disruption
of the woman’s life plans and projects the way a violent assault by a born person
most often does”) (emphasis omitted). This opposition to the application of selfdefense to abortion holds abortion to an ad-hoc high standard. The danger that
has sufficed to justify fatal violence in decisional law has not had to be as severe
or urgent as what these writings demand.
154. “Pregnancy complications” ranks as the sixth leading cause of death for
women ages 20–34, according to CDC data. Leading Causes of Death by Age
Group, All Females-United States, 2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
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more-probable-than-not hurdles of proof. The criterion of
serious bodily harm makes the privilege available under
circumstances not dire enough to pose a risk of death.155
Because self-defense is an option rather than an
obligation, a host can welcome what the presence of a Zef
does to her.156 She can discount the detriments of pregnancy
and parturition, ascribe them to nature or the will of God,
seek to lessen their impact through conscientious behaviors
(dietary supplements or restrictions, medical attentions), put
them out of her mind, or even enjoy them. But happy or stoic
responses to danger are not the only ones the law will
approve. Just because other people—even, for all we know,
most other people—embrace a condition that comes with
risks of death and severe hurt does not mean that you or I
have to embrace that condition too. An ideology of mandatory
self-abnegation cannot coexist with the privilege of selfdefense. If we may not apply the necessary amount of harm
to protect our bodies from destruction or extraordinary pain,
then our common law right to look out for ourselves has been
trammeled.
The geography of pregnancy expands and clarifies the
application of justified deadly force. Defense of habitation, a
privilege closely related to self-defense, honors the same
interest—safety from a threat to one’s life and body—by
focusing on the home as a locus of the privilege.157 “The house
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/women/lcod/2010/WomenAll_2010.pdf
visited Sept. 3, 2015).

(last

155. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 456 n.15 (2d
ed. 1986) (noting that deadly force may be applied to resist rape because rape is
among “the most extreme intrusions” even when it does not cause death or
physical injury); Gregory A. Diamond, Note, To Have but Not to Hold: Can
“Resistance Against Kidnapping” Justify Lethal Self-Defense Against
Incapacitated Batterers?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 729, 745-46, 745 n.96 (2002) (noting
the position of the Model Penal Code and most jurisdictions that deadly force may
be used to prevent or escape kidnapping).
156. Self-defense could be obligatory rather than mandatory, contrary to the
common law. See David B. Kopel, The Torah and Self-Defense, 109 PENN ST. L.
REV. 17, 36 (2004) (describing the provision in Jewish law of pikuach nefesh,
which compels individuals to save human lives whether they want to or not).
157. “Because a home provides a ‘sanctuary’ or ‘castle’ where one is free from
both governmental and private intrusions, ‘our law has long recognized that the
home provides a kind of special sanctuary in modern life.’” F. Patrick Hubbard,
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of every one is his castle,” proclaimed the great common law
jurist Sir Edward Coke.158 Switching to Latin in the middle of
his proclamation, Coke went on to declare that “each man’s
home is his safest refuge.”159 This “castle doctrine” is not
understood literally, as almost nobody gets to live in a castle.
Its metaphor about the geographic boundary around every
personal space forms two rules related to the defense of
habitation. First, the possessor of a dwelling place may take
reasonable measures, as severe as they need to be, to keep
invaders out. Second, although a person when attacked out
in the world usually must retreat before he may apply deadly
force to an assailant, he has no such duty when an invader
has entered his home.160
The first castle-doctrine rule implies a common law right
to practice contraception—an issue outside the scope of this
Article but related to its claim—while the second rule speaks
more directly to abortion by emphasizing how personhood
depends on, and indeed is formed by, a zone of intimate
space.161 Every Zef makes costly demands on the interior of
its host. Understood by its behaviors, it is a ruthless invader.
Having an unwanted visitor inside one’s brick-andmortar “castle” is unwelcome and perhaps frightening, but
trivial compared to the invasion of pregnancy.162 When the
Zef is wanted by its host, the “terror and violence”163 that it
will visit on her are none of the law’s business. Understood
as gross anatomy, however—apart from frames like
optimism, religious faith, or ambitions about oneself as a
mother-to-be—the depredations wreaked by a Zef are much
worse than what decisional law permits individuals to ward
The Value of Life: Constitutional Limits on Citizens’ Use of Deadly Force, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 623, 638 (2014) (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742, 886 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The human body is also a locus of
freedom from governmental and private intrusions.
158. Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 194; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 a.
159. Id. at 195, 91 b (“domus sua cuique est tulissimum refugium.”).
160. Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 555 (1895); Regina v. Smith (1837)
173 Eng. Rep. 441, 441; 8 Car. & P. 160, 160.
161. See Mae Kuykendall, Restatement of Place, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 757, 772-73
(2014) (exploring how place is central to identity).
162. See supra Part I.A.
163. See VERTOSICK, supra note 39, at 106 (describing childbirth).
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off with deadly force. If the common law takes the external
habitation of a person seriously, a fortiori it must take the
internal space of a person’s body more seriously. If the
invasion of a cottage or hovel bestows rights on a possessor
to cause harm, then the invasion of a person from the inside
bestows stronger versions of these rights.
Once the invasion no longer takes place from inside, the
privilege to inflict deadly force upon a Zef ends. There is no
longer anything to defend against: no intimate invasion, no
threat to a metaphoric castle, no peril to the physical welfare
of a host. The erstwhile Zef has outgrown its awkward
acronym. It is now a baby (and is eligible to qualify for other
nouns, such as toddler, as it ages) who does not occupy the
interior of any other person. It can be passed to an array of
caregivers. Killing it as a source of danger becomes
comparable to shooting an invader after the invader has
departed and no longer can harm the shooter; in that setting,
common law precepts deny the privilege of self-defense.164
Habitation and its castle doctrine help to alleviate confusion
about the beginning and end of self-defense in the context of
terminating pregnancy. The outline of the host’s body
delineates her interests and her entitlement to defend herself
with deadly force.
The second self-defense precept pertinent to abortion is
that the application of deadly force can be justified even when
the target of that force bears no moral responsibility for the
peril. For the defense to apply, the killed aggressor need not
have acted in a blameworthy way.165 Nor must self-defense be
164. See, e.g., Woolfolk v. State, 644 S.E.2d 828, 830 (Ga. 2007) (disallowing selfdefense when the confrontation had ended and the victim had retreated to her
car); Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 218 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Mass. 1966) (noting that
the privilege of self-defense ends “when the necessity ends”); David W. Robertson,
The Aggressor Doctrine, 1 S.U. L. REV. 82, 84 (1975) (emphasizing prevention as
central to self-defense). The “fleeing felon” category provides a limited exception,
see infra notes 164-74 and accompanying text, but fleeing felons are acting
culpably when they experience deadly force from the aggressor and deadly force
is necessary to stop their crime; both in their aggressive culpability and their
power to complete a crime if not stopped, they are very different from a Zef.
165. Cases featuring mistake support the point. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 73
A.3d 599, 601, 605 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (reversing to require a jury instruction
when a defendant contended he had fired a shot in self-defense and hit the wrong
person); Caroline Forell, What’s Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in
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the sole motive for the use of force.166 Self-defense does not
tolerate the application of deadly force to what Shlomit
Wallerstein in her study of the defense calls “innocent
bystanders,”167 but the Zef is not among bystanders, or
individuals harmed by a person who feels threatened and
hurts them in a panicky effort to survive.168 The Zef has
occupied the inside of a person and ranked its interests above
hers, even though it lacks consciousness or motive.
A defender’s right to use deadly force is available even
when the aggressor has no intent to harm. What this
aggressor has is “bad luck,”169 and this misfortune makes him
“causally responsible for the aggression that created a
situation in which either he or the defender will have to
suffer the consequences.”170 Deadly force applied to kill the
unlucky aggressor-invader does not violate the aggressor’s
right to life, Wallerstein concludes, and does not wrong
him.171 As applied in real-life conflicts, the common law of
self-defense aligns with this philosophical account. Critics of
self-defense as applied to abortion misread the right to rid
oneself of an internal invader as narrower than it is.172 A
crabbed interpretation of the privilege, limiting deadly-force
options to the purest of innocent victim-assailants and the

Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1408-13 (2010)
(discussing a 1992 case where a Louisiana homeowner, having shot and killed a
Japanese exchange student who had come onto his premises on Halloween, was
acquitted of manslaughter after claiming self-defense).
166. Shlomit Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of
Forced Consequences, 91 VA. L. REV. 999, 1014 n.43 (2005) (adverting to “multiple
reasons”).
167. Id. at 1001-02.
168. As human shields or even food, for example.
169. Wallerstein, supra note 166, at 1029.
170. Id. at 1031.
171. Id.
172. See Nancy Davis, Abortion and Self-Defense, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175, 18587 (1984) (arguing that “the clearest cases” of justified self-defense involve
aggressors who started the confrontation by acting in a blameworthy way,
defenders who bore no responsibility for their predicament, and the very fast
infliction of deadly force with little reflection beforehand).
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most urgent circumstances that befall them, is simply not
present in the common law.173
The third self-defense precept is that threats to life and
health are at the center of the privilege to inflict deadly force,
but they are not necessary for it to exist. Consider the
common law privilege to apply deadly force to a fleeing felon.
The fleeing-felon doctrine shares the willingness of selfdefense to condone deadly force for the sake of preventing
danger174—but its danger can be more remote than a threat
to life, health, or habitation. The fleeing-felon category
teaches how capaciously the common law extends a
justification to kill another person.
Fleeing-felon licenses to kill as furnished by the common
law are so generous to shooters that they went too far even
for the Supreme Court circa 1985, a tribunal strongly
inclined to think that targets of the police deserve what they
get.175 The Court agreed with the State of Tennessee that the
common law had indeed long allowed “the use of whatever

173. Christopher W. Behan, When Turnabout is Fair Play: Character Evidence
and Self-Defense in Homicide and Assault Cases, 86 OR. L. REV. 733, 749-50 (2007)
(observing that the common law of self-defense permits defendants to attack the
character of the persons they killed, but most U.S. jurisdictions give the
prosecution no opportunity to mount a counterattack on the defendant’s
character); Major David Bolgiano et al., Defining the Right of Self-Defense:
Working Toward the Use of a Deadly Force Appendix to the Standing Rules of
Engagement for the Department of Defense, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 157, 167 (2002)
(noting that the common law does not modify its broad privilege to use deadly
force with requirements that might discourage its use, such as a duty to consider
non-lethal alternatives or try a gentler response first). The killing of a Japanese
exchange student mistakenly perceived by a homeowner as an invader resulted
in an acquittal that required only a couple of hours’ deliberation and met with
support in the defendant’s community. See Forell, supra note 165, at 1408-13.
174. See John Simon, Note, Tennessee v. Garner: The Fleeing Felon Rule,
30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1259, 1264 (1986).
175. One noted Supreme Court advocate has recalled “Supreme Court decisions
from the 1970s that gave the green light to oppressive police investigative
practices.” Walter Dellinger, The Court May No Longer Be the Head Cheerleader
for the War on Drugs, SLATE (June 25, 2014, 4:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/scotus_roundup/su
preme_court_roundup_does_today_s_cellphone_decision_mean_the_court_like.
html.
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force was necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon”176
but deemed this much power obsolete for modern policing
and struck it down as an unlawful seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.177 Dissenters duly noted that the majority had
jettisoned a “venerable common-law rule” accepted in “nearly
half the States.”178
Contemporary court decisions have allowed non-police
defendants to get away with killing other persons who were
fleeing and thus posing no threat to anyone’s life or health.179
In State v. Cooney, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed a murder conviction following the shooting of a man
whom the shooter had good reason to think had stolen from
his plumbing business.180 The court held that the defendant
was entitled to a jury instruction justifying deadly force
because he had acted in pursuit of a fleeing felon.181 The facts
of another case put the killer in a more sympathetic light—
the victim had lunged at him before running away—but, as
with Cooney, deadly force was not necessary to guard against
danger.182 The common law as applied in the United States
has condoned numerous applications of deadly force upon
persons who posed no imminent threat to life or health, with
both private citizens and police officers doing the inflicting.183
The fourth precept: self-defense is asserted in behalf of,
and not necessarily by, a threatened person. The privilege to
defend others as well as oneself means that the common law
justifies the violence of termination done by someone other
176. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
177. Id. at 11-15.
178. Id. at 22-23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
179. Two such cases are analyzed in Hubbard, supra note 157, at 634-35.
180. State v. Cooney, 463 S.E.2d 597, 598 (S.C. 1995). The shooter was white,
and the “fleeing felon” he killed was black. Hubbard, supra note 157, at 623.
181. Cooney, 463 S.E.2d at 599.
182. People v. Couch, 461 N.W.2d 683, 684, 689 (Mich. 1990).
183. See Jane Y. Chong, Note, Targeting the Twenty-First-Century Outlaw, 122
YALE L.J. 724, 763-64 (2012) (noting condoned powers of private actors enlisted
as posse comitatus); see also id. at 762 (“[N]umerous federal courts have
determined that a common law rule authorizing the use of deadly force [by the
police] against a fleeing felon does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”).
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than the pregnant host if the person who terminates acted to
defend her.184 It thus recognizes a defense that justifies action
taken to kill a Zef even when the actor is not himself invaded
or physically threatened by pregnancy.
Defense of others admittedly adds complication to the
common law defense of abortion. Whereas defense of selfposits a simple binary of a defendant who felt threatened and
a victim whose conduct posed a threat, any claimant who
enters the scene to defend a host by killing a Zef makes an
external judgment about who is the aggressor and who needs
defending, a debatable assignment of labels.185 Opponents of
abortion would presumably disagree about the status of the
Zef as aggressor against which deadly force may justifiably
be applied.186 So might other observers, regardless of their
ideology. Nevertheless the fourth point stands in general
terms: the common law privileges the choice to kill an
invader for the sake of defending another person.
Fifth and last, applications of deadly force that meet the
criteria for self-defense are not excused, which implies nonresponsibility for wrongful conduct, but instead justified,
which means the action was warranted.187 This classic
division showcases a telling feature of abortion bans in the
United States: prohibitions do not punish the host who
184. But see Davis, supra note 172, at 188 (arguing that the outsider’s privilege
is not as strong as that of the host). The narrower focus of this Article, confined
to what the common law rather than ethics says about abortion, identifies parity
between the privilege to defend oneself and the privilege to defend another.
185. Thus an opponent of abortion might claim defense of others as a privilege
for her violent interference with a termination by contending that she is looking
out for the Zef just as the abortion provider is looking out for the host. The trouble
with this contention is that defense of others justifies the use of force only against
unlawful force. DOBBS, supra note 107, at 169 n.4. If termination of pregnancy is
covered by self-defense and (for the person performing the termination) defense
of others, then its violence is not unlawful, and an opponent of the procedure may
not use defense of others as a privilege to interfere with the termination.
186. The killers of abortion providers such as physicians George Tiller and
Barnett Slepian might have thought of themselves as acting in defense of others,
whereas they could not have claimed self-defense.
187. Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE
L.J. 1, 3-4 (2003) (summarizing a consensus on the definitions of excuse and
justification).
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chooses to terminate and instead focus on conduct by persons
or entities that perform the procedure or make it possible.188
Why?189 After all, one who hires a contract killer shares
criminal responsibility for homicide.190 Criminalizers of
abortion who impose no penalties to the host must believe
that her actions are in effect excused. The host has taken
affirmative steps to kill what is inside her, but she is also a
victim—of a seducer, perhaps, or of abortion-promoting
ideology. Proponents of criminalization do not speak clearly
on the point.191
The common law of self-defense brings clarity to this
murkiness about whether a host may be punished for
terminating a Zef. If one of the self-defense privileges (selfdefense, defense of habitation, defense of others) applies,
then the killing of a Zef becomes justified. The host is
188. Abortion crimes that decline to punish the pregnant individual have been
codified both before and after Roe. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116-17, 164,
117 n.1 (1973) (invalidating a Texas statute providing that “any person” who
“shall use towards [a pregnant woman] any violence or means whatever
externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an abortion . . . shall be
confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years”); MKB
Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 954 F. Supp. 2d 900, 903, 913-14 (D.N.D. 2013)
(overturning North Dakota’s criminalization of furnishing (but not of having) an
abortion later than the sixth week of pregnancy). A bill passed by the United
States House of Representatives in 2013 penalized the provision of abortions after
the twentieth week but declined to include pregnant individuals in this
punishment. See Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 1797, 113th
Cong. § 1532(d) (2013) (noting that the law forbids prosecution of a woman who
receives an abortion in violation of the act for violating or conspiring to violate
the act).
189. See Anna Quindlen, How Much Jail Time?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 2007, at 68
(considering why anti-abortion demonstrators do not have an opinion on criminal
punishment of women who have abortions); see also AtCenterNetwork,
Libertyville Abortion Demonstration, YOUTUBE (July 30, 2007), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Uk6t_tdOkwo (showing that anti-abortion demonstrators
either do not think women who have abortions should face criminal consequences
or do not know whether criminal punishment would be appropriate).
190. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2012) (codifying murder for hire as a federal crime);
Richard G. Jones, Legal Saga Ends for Man Who Hired Wife’s Killer, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2006, at B5 (describing pursuit by New Jersey prosecutors of the death
penalty against the hirer of a killer).
191. Responses to the Quindlen essay and the YouTube video interviewing
opponents of abortion rights, see supra note 189, exist, according to my searches
of terms like “quindlen jail time,” but tend to get taken down from the Internet.
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responsible for the killing but not culpable. Excuse, rarely
used to support full acquittal of a homicide, does not fit the
intentional killing of a Zef by a host. A host’s choice to impose
deadly force on a Zef must be either justified or an act that is
culpable and calls for her punishment. Because the Zef
threatens her life, safety, and bodily integrity, her
application of deadly force to the Zef is warranted; because
this deadly force is warranted, it is justified. Consistent with
this analysis, the common law did not punish pregnant
women who acted to terminate their own pregnancies.192
Common law doctrines from property build on and
extend the five precepts from self-defense beyond criminal
law. Here we return to the body as its owner’s habitation,
occupied inside and out.193 Just as the common law of crimes
recognizes a privilege to apply deadly force to the Zef in its
role as an unwelcome and dangerous intruder, the common
law of property contains numerous forms of action that
recognize the right of a host to attain what may be described
as quiet title to herself.194 Other common law forms of action
that apply by analogy to abortion include ejectment, eviction,
and estrepement.195 Possessors may evict and eject unwanted
occupants from everywhere they possess, says the common
law—even a place they value much less than their own
bodies, such as an outbuilding.
This deference continues in the common law position that
possessors may tell would-be entrants to go away from a locus
they own or control even when their rejection appears harsh,
unreasonable, or antisocial. As phrased in a leading treatise,
the most central tenet of property law “entails the right to
exclude others from some discrete thing.”196 Courts do not
balance the good of exclusion against the good of access. They
192. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
194. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 222 (AM. LAW INST. 1936) (defining
quiet title).
195. See, e.g., Voss v. Green, 389 A.2d 273, 274 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (noting
that plaintiffs brought an ejection action while defendants sought a writ of
estrepement).
196. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
POLICIES, at v (2007).
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side overwhelmingly with excluder-possessors in trespass
cases, even when an entrant had compelling reasons to get
inside.197 They also furnish possessors with injunctions as
well as damages,198 even though common law judges rarely
use their injunctive powers in tort actions.199 If in practice the
law of abortion hewed faithfully to the common law, then
although courts might find it difficult to apply exclusion
against a Zef they would have no tolerance for—and, upon
the petition of a possessor, would swiftly enjoin—a
requirement on the books of some states that imposes entry
into “some discrete thing” in a manner unfortunately not at
all unique: vaginal penetration that is unwanted by the
person penetrated and that gives her no benefit.200
Once an entry occurs, the common law of property-andtorts, mirroring the rule of limited duty to most categories of
visitors,201 continues to side with possessors. For trespass to
land claims, tort munificently drops its usual demand that a
plaintiff allege injury—it will infer that disruption to the
blades of grass on the possessor’s premises is enough202—and
197. See Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1091 (2011)
(arguing for a shift in the common law to permit a larger set of nonconsensual
entries).
198. Id.
199. See Howard W. Brill, Equitable Remedies for Common Law Torts,
1999 ARK. L. NOTES 1 (surveying numerous common law subcategories of tort to
note that injunctions are rare).
200. Several jurisdictions have chosen to compel ultrasound examinations of
abortion patients. See Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How
Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 28-29, 29 n.142 (2012). Statutes compelling providers to use the
examination technology that provides the clearest image of the Zef make an
indirect but unambiguous demand that the patient undergo penetration of her
vagina with a transducer probe, regardless of whether she wants or needs that
penetration. Id. at 28-30.
201. See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
202. This capacious understanding of a possessor’s entitlements applies to
claims against government intruders and private landholders alike. Dougherty v.
Stepp, 18 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 370, 370-71 (1835) (“From every such entry
against the will of the possessor, the law infers some damage; if nothing more,
the treading down the grass or the herbage.”); Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19
Howell’s State Trials 1030, 1066 (“By the laws of England, every invasion of
private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon
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withholds the favoritism about mistake that it gives actors
who claim self-defense. Thus whereas someone who inflicts
physical harm on another person in the mistaken but
reasonable belief that this victim is his deadly enemy has a
good claim for self-defense, an entry into another’s land that
the entrant reasonably but mistakenly believes is his own
does not defeat a trespass claim.203
B. One May Withhold Benevolence and Favors
Picture a blind man who starts to cross the street and
walks into the path of an approaching automobile, unaided
by a heartless bystander who watches the blind man walk
and who “by a word or touch,” moreover “without delaying his
own progress,” could easily have acted to prevent the
accident.204 No duty to that bystander, says tort law, and thus
no liability, no matter how easy the rescue intervention
would have been.205 Same result when “A comes across B, who
is lying face down in a puddle, seemingly unconscious and
likely to drown if he remains that way, and A can easily flip
B over with his foot, thereby saving his life,” and A does not
bother, walking on by.206
Grisly hypotheticals like these function as illustrations
but the carnage of no-duty is not hypothetical. Numerous
individuals known to decisional law failed to receive help
when they were in peril, suffered physical injury that they
attributed to the inaction of a particular person, complained
in court, and were rebuffed by judges who held that tort

my ground without my license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage
be nothing.”).
203. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 130, at 328; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 94, at
653.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
205. Id.
206. Elizabeth A. Weeks, Beyond Compensation: Using Torts to Promote Public
Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 27, 37 (2007).
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recognizes no affirmative obligation to rescue. 207 The most
memorable cases are old, but the rule persists.208
The common law no-duty stance bestows numerous
freedoms to act without care for the welfare of a fellow human
being. Judges did not come to recognize the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress until the twentieth century,
and to this day they rarely encounter a claim they approve.209
This aversion to redress leaves both intentional and reckless
outrages undeterred. Heedless conduct (for example sloppy
financial advice, poor auditing of a business investment
vehicle, careless obstruction of a public highway or utility
needed for someone to earn her living) generates numerous
varieties of financial loss, most of which have no remedy in
tort on the ground that the person who acted carelessly owed
the victim no duty of care.210 No-duty rules also bar claims for
physical injuries attributable to conditions on land. The
common law indulges possessors by denying recourse for
injury to visitors except those present after the ownerpossessor made it clear he wanted them. As far as the
common law cares, you may keep your home and yard strewn
207. Consider Carl Buch, an eight-year-old boy who roamed into a mill and got
his hand severely mangled in a machine; the judges who rejected his claim
assumed that his injury could have been prevented by a warning. Buch v. Armory
Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898). After Joseph Yania jumped into a trench filled
with water and drowned, more than inaction was present; a court conceded
arguendo that the defendant, standing nearby, had lured Yania to jump. Yania v.
Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 345 (Pa. 1959). Another drowned plaintiff, Albert Osterlind,
had rented a canoe from the defendant Hill. Both Osterlind and a friend who
joined him in the canoe were visibly drunk at the time of rental. Ken Levy, Killing,
Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism, 44 GA. L. REV.
607, 623 (2010). When the boat overturned, Hill heard Osterlind’s cries for help
but “utterly ignored” them. Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (Mass. 1928). All
three plaintiffs in these cases lost on the ground that defendants owed them no
duty, and none of the three decisions has been overruled. Osterlind, 160 N.E. at
302; Buch, 44 A. at 811; Yania, 155 A. at 346.
208. So says the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“An actor whose
conduct has not created a risk of physical or emotional harm to another has no
duty of care to the other unless a court determines that one of the affirmative
duties provided in [other sections] is applicable.”).
FOR

209. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 94, at 683-86.
210. See Anita Bernstein, Keep it Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No
Recovery for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773 (2006).
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with skateboards, spilled grease, shaky banisters, cut-glass
coffee tables with sharp edges, terrifying works of art on the
wall: do as you like. You need not make your premises
reasonably safe for any visitor except one who holds the
favored label of invitee.211
“Easy rescue” summarizes the academic contention that
the law ought to require more in the form of rescue when the
needed effort would not burden the rescuer much. Jeremy
Bentham favored this reform,212 and a much-cited
philosophical defense of easy rescue contends that this
development would accord not only with moral theory—of
both the utilitarian and deontological kind—but line-drawing
that modern courts can achieve. While every no-duty rule
applies to the right to cease housing and nurturing a Zef in
that it gives another example of how pervasively the common
law tolerates indifference to the welfare of another person,
easy rescue is particularly pertinent.213
From the perspective of a host-rescuer, aid to a Zef is the
opposite of easy. It always comes at a price even when one’s
pregnancy is deeply wanted. Pregnancy in the best-case
scenario is protracted, risky, and financially costly. The
degree of rescue demanded by a perilous or unwanted
pregnancy compounds these burdens. Rearing the child that
will result from an unterminated pregnancy is never easy.
Tort law does not demand even the easiest rescues. It permits
a potential rescuer to escape responsibility after rendering
nothing at all.
An example of an easy rescue that the common law
permits individuals to withhold even though the consequence
of refusal will be dire is recounted in McFall v. Shimp,214
where David Shimp refused to give his cousin Robert McFall
211. See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 94, at 88, 94-96.
212. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 292-93 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789)
(contending that a duty should be imposed on “every man to save another from
mischief, when it can be done without prejudicing himself”).
213. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247
(1980).
214. 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1978).
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a donation of bone marrow that he was uniquely able to
provide.215 McFall died shortly after failing to win the
donation injunction he sought in court.216 Donating bone
marrow is not as easy as tapping a blind stranger before he
enters the path of an automobile, or using one’s foot to push
someone’s face out of a puddle, but it is much easier than
unwanted pregnancy followed by unwanted childbirth
followed by unwanted parenthood.217 Still too awful for a
court to inflict on the unwilling: “[f]orceable extraction of
living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind,”
wrote the McFall judge.218 Court-ordered extraction of bone
marrow would “raise the spectre of the swastika and the
Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this portends.”219
McFall showcases what appears to be an especially
severe instance of no duty, but its holding comports with the
common law’s refusal to conscript human bodies to help
another person. Consider Curran v. Bosze, where a
noncustodial parent tried to enlist his three-year-old twins
for blood testing for the benefit of his older child who required
a donation of bone marrow to stay alive.220 The twins’
custodial parent refused to consent and the Illinois Supreme
Court sided with her.221 Like McFall of McFall v. Shimp, the
older child in Curran died soon after failing to win an
injunction.222 A couple of years earlier another Illinois court
had ordered the same touching of the twins’ bodies, the
extraction of blood with a needle, when Nancy Curran
wanted to establish a genetic relationship between them and

215. Perhaps appalled by their father’s callousness, defendant’s four children
all volunteered to donate but were deemed ineligible. Michele Goodwin, My
Sister’s Keeper?: Law, Children, and Compelled Donation, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
357, 386 (2007).
216. Id. at 386-88.
217. See id. at 387 & n.103.
218. McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 92.
219. Id.
220. 566 N.E. 2d 1319, 1320-21 (Ill. 1990).
221. Id. at 1320-21, 1345.
222. Goodwin, supra note 215, at 388, 390.
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Tamas Bosze.223 The Curran court declined to permit another
round of that invasion. To explain its ruling, the court in a
long opinion relied entirely on the common law.224
No case contrary to McFall and Curran exists in the
annals of published American judicial decisions. The only
qualification to the sweeping prohibition asserted in these
decisions is that judges sometimes permit the extraction of
organs and tissue from young children for the benefit of
siblings.225 Courts take that position, however, only after
putting themselves through the paces of substituted
judgment. They allow this extraction only after they conclude
that the minor donor values the life of her or his relative
enough to accept physical invasion in service of that end.226
Substituted judgment as a common law doctrine functions, at
least in principle, to protect a human body from incursions
that the possessor of that body would not want.227
Let us now consider whether any other tort precepts can
aid a Zef at the expense of its host notwithstanding the
common law rule about rescue. The possibility of an
undertaking has already been dispatched.228 Two other
possibilities remain. First, a special relationship exception to
no-duty might be present. Tort law says that rescue efforts
are owed by jailers to their locked-up inmates, employers to
employees, hospitals to patients;229 it recognizes other rescuecompelling relationships as well.230 From here, just as a

223. Today paternity is established by noninvasive testing, but in November,
1987, blood was drawn. Curran, 566 N.E. 2d at 1320.
224. Id. at 1326-31.
225. Goodwin, supra note 215.
226. Id. at 398.
227. See Curran, 566 N.E. 2d at 1330-31 (reviewing decisions where courts
refused to support the petitions of parents who were trying to save their sick
children). The common law also declines to cooperate with the harvesting of body
parts from corpses. See infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 40 (2012). Tort law only obliges
reasonable efforts at rescue, not successful completion of those efforts.
230. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 94, at 83-88.
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parent owes affirmative duties to his own child, a host might
owe affirmative duties to a Zef.
This status relationship disappears, however, because
statuses on point do not exist. Decisional law expects a pair
of nouns as labels for the defendant and the plaintiff:
innkeeper-guest, prison-prisoner, school-student, and so
on.231 Zef is not an authentic common noun as far as case law
is concerned,232 and “host” is no better than the clearly
inadequate “woman” or “mother” to describe the putative
rescuer as parallel to the word “parent” used to reference a
person who owes a duty of care to her or his own child. No
matched set of nouns suggests no status relationship.233 And
as already discussed, a born child is different from a Zef.234
The other tort possibility that might rescue the
unwelcome Zef from termination comes from the distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Abortion could
constitute affirmative infliction of harm. To my mind this
position is stronger than the attempt to find a statusrelationship exception to the no-duty rule. Killing seems
different from letting die.235 Perhaps it is not different,236 but
even so tort monitors the line between misfeasance and
nonfeasance. “[I]f abortions are to be acts of refusing to help,
and not deliberate acts of killing,” philosopher Laurie Shrage

231. Even a famous outlier, Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976),
said the plaintiff and the defendant were “companions on a social venture.” Id. at
222.
232. On June 14, 2015, I searched for “zef” in the cases database of Westlaw and
got sixty-nine hits. All turned out to be proper nouns, mostly first names of
individuals.
233. See Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 129, 131-32 (2003).
234. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
235. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59
MONIST 204 (1976).
236. See Rosalind S. Simson, What Does the Right to Life Really Entail? A
Framework for Depolarizing the Abortion Debate, 14 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 107,
118 & n.35 (2014) (assembling sources that equate letting die with killing).
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continues, “then abortions should be limited to removing the
fetus and not include extinguishing its life.”237
Agreed: but until technology emerges to effect this ideal
of abortion via removal of a living Zef rather than the
elimination of its life,238 the second argument also is defeated,
this time because tort has no quarrel with the decision of a
host to kill the Zef inside her.239 The host has the same selfdefense rights in tort as she has under the law of crimes,240
the consequence of the affirmative defense changing from
justification in criminal law to no liability in tort.241 Invasion
of one’s body against one’s will is an onslaught that tort law
permits an individual to repel and resist.242 Because the
privilege of self-defense defeats a claim of battery brought by
237. SHRAGE, supra note 153, at 70. But see MCDONAGH, supra note 18, at 79 (“If
the intention in the termination of a late pregnancy is to preserve the life of the
fetus, this is not, strictly speaking, an abortion at all.”).
238. See Stephen G. Gilles, Does the Right to Elective Abortion Include the Right
to Ensure the Death of the Fetus?, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2015)
(envisioning artificial wombs). Remaining pregnant, giving birth, and then
relinquishing the neonate for adoption strikes some observers as a reasonable
alternative to abortion for a pregnant individual who does not want to be the
mother of a new child. See Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2002)
(reviewing a Louisiana statute that created an optional license plate slogan,
“Choose Life,” and sent its revenue to nonprofits that offer adoption-not-abortion
guidance to pregnant clients). It has not proved convenient for relinquishers. See
JOE SOLL & KAREN WILSON BUTERBAUGH, ADOPTION HEALING: A PATH TO
RECOVERY FOR MOTHERS WHO LOST CHILDREN TO ADOPTION (2003) (describing
emotional distress); J. A. Aloi, Nursing the Disenfranchised: Women Who Have
Relinquished an Infant for Adoption, 16 J. PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH
NURSING 27, 29 (2009) (observing that severe grief is compounded by both the
absence of social recognition of any loss and a belief that the birth mother lost her
baby voluntarily, through selfishness).
239. See Regan, supra note 33, at 1575 (arguing that although “removing the
fetus in a way which renders it inviable” looks like an act, “it ought to be viewed
as an omission, or as part of a course of conduct amounting in overall effect to an
omission,” because “[i]t is the only way, in the real world, for a pregnant woman
to discontinue the burdensome course of aid to the fetus”).
240. See Alex Dzioba, No Defense for Self-Defense: Determining Whether Courts
Should Order Insurers to Represent Insureds Who Have Acted in Self-Defense, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 223 (2013).
241. Tort does not recognize excuses, only justifications. John C.P. Goldberg,
Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 485 (2015).
242. Dzioba, supra note 240, at 223 (citing cases).
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or on behalf of the terminated Zef, any obligation that a host
might have to remain pregnant against her will, thereby
rendering benevolence to an entity she may regard as an
intruder, cannot be found in the common law of torts.
The common law of property maintains the same posture
as tort when deeming human bio-matter amenable to harvest
from corpses. We have considered how the common law
declines to help a desperately ill person when an incursion
into the body of another human being—something trivial in
comparison to the hardships of unwanted pregnancy,
parturition, and motherhood—would give the ill person her
only chance to live.243 The same disinclination appears after
death in the common law’s refusal to recognize property
rights in a human corpse.244 No property right means nobody
has authority to transfer any part of a cadaver to a buyer or
donee.245 Persons who want to use the organs or fluids of a
dead body are out of luck unless their legislature anticipated
their need in advance. Why the remains of a deceased
individual may not be exploited to help the living is not
obvious: after all, if not put to use the organs will rot.246 The
common law says let them rot unless their late proprietor
consented to their removal. In its rules about property as well
as its rules about torts, it rates freedom to control one’s body
higher than the possibility of gain to families or communities,
including the preservation of beloved human life.
Consistent with this doctrinal posture, unjust
enrichment complements the tort side of the common law
defense of abortion by recognizing wrongful gain as well as
wrongful loss. Both of these consequences exist when a
pregnancy is unwanted. When present against the host’s will,
the Zef receives unjust enrichment, or what is “materially
identical” to the “payment of a non-existent debt.”247 Just as
the common law provides that a host need not render costly
243. See supra Part III.B.
244. See Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human
Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 57, 58 (1989); Looper-Friedman, supra note
29, at 276.
245. Hansmann, supra note 244, at 58.
246. Christopher Robertson, Framing the Organ System: Altruism or
Cooperation?, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 46, 47 (2004).
247. PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3 (2d ed. 2005).
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beneficence to a Zef, it also condemns the receipt of benefits
obtained by an unwelcome invader. Because the Zef had no
entitlement to the beneficial conditions it took, objection to
the exploitative taking by the host is enough to render this
enrichment unjust. Lack of a remedy to recoup the gain of the
invasion does not make this wrong right.
IV. HOW COMMON LAW FUNDAMENTALS OF THE RIGHT TO
ABORTION FELL FROM VIEW: A SHORT POLITICAL HISTORY
Social conditions, which always influence how rules of
law are read and applied, have impeded understanding of
common law rights related to the termination of pregnancy.
The common law has consistently had no trouble recognizing
entitlements to repel an intruder with deadly force and to
withhold favors or benevolence. It has been less able to
perceive a pregnant individual as a holder of these common
law rights.
This inability is manifest in academic writing that
criticizes or rejects the right to terminate pregnancy. When
one law review article contended that this legal entitlement
cannot exist because “[n]o person’s freedom extends as far as
killing or harming another person,”248 the author may have
believed what he wrote (and his cite-checkers let it pass),
even though the most glancing familiarity with the law—and
not only American common law: one could limit one’s source
to statutory law, international law, religious law, customary
law, or the law of any other nation-state—leads one to
numerous examples of perfectly legal killing and hurting.249
Michael Stokes Paulsen had to overlook the same sources
when he wrote that Roe v. Wade, by granting a “private
license to some human beings to kill other human beings,”

248. Dwight G. Duncan, When is a Human Being Not a Legal Person?: Lethal
Ramifications at the Beginning of Life, 8 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 82, 85
(2013).
249. See, e.g., PAMELA BARMASH, HOMICIDE IN THE BIBLICAL WORLD 152, 206
(2005) (noting approval of self-defense); PIETER SPIERENBURG, A HISTORY OF
MURDER: PERSONAL VIOLENCE IN EUROPE FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE PRESENT
65-142 (2008) (describing privileges and tolerance for male killers).
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installed “a moral atrocity”250 rather than business as usual.
The error extends beyond the academy.251
The common law frees, and always has freed, individuals
to
terminate
their
pregnancies,
albeit
through
noninterference and inaction rather than overt affirmation of
a right.252 Historical circumstances have made this liberty
hard to observe. One crucial such fact, in place for millennia:
the absence of safe and effective termination technology.
A. Old Law, New Choice: Abortion Technology Moves
Forward
Safety and effectiveness are fundamental not only to
abortion but to any potential solution to a problem that an
individual can choose. These two values pertain especially to
an intervention that, like this one, addresses bodily integrity
and health.253 “Safe” in this context means not dangerous to
the individual’s life and well-being. “Effective” means that
the abortion must eliminate the Zef completely from her
body.
As was noted, human beings have for centuries desired
abortions.254 In this quest they have faced a formidable
250. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1021 (2003).
251. For example, Katha Pollitt saw a sign at the 2013 March for Life in
Washington, DC: “BABIES GESTATING IN UTERO MAY ENGAGE IN SELFDEFENSE AND STAND THEIR GROUND CUS UTERI ARE THEIR RIGHTFUL
HOMES FOR 9 MONTHS.” POLLITT, supra note 52, at 155. This senseless
assertion—who ever stopped “babies gestating in utero” from “stand[ing] their
ground” if they want to try?—implicitly denies the pregnant person her right to
self-defense against an unwelcome occupant by recognizing a privilege for
invaders rather than the person who experiences an invasion. Only if a person
lacks common law rights can the interior of her body be someone else’s “rightful
home[ ]” over her objection. See id.
252. Justice Blackmun said as much in his review of abortion in the common
law. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116, 135 & n.26 (1973) (noting the view of
“some scholars” that the common law was never applied to abortion, and
suggesting that anti-abortion pronouncements by Sir Edward Coke about
common law provisions “may have intentionally misstated the law”).
253. See Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through
Personal Injury Litigation, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1051, 1069, 1071, 1099 (2007).
254. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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barrier: Zefs, like other life forms, cling to life when
threatened.255 Safety and effectiveness again. Against this
struggle, abortion technologies had to be powerful enough to
eliminate the Zef (i.e. effective) yet gentle (or safe) enough to
preserve the life of the pregnant individual. In his study of
abortion history, Joseph Dellapenna argues persuasively
that this combination did not come together until the
nineteenth century.256
Would-be terminators of pregnancy did have pre-modern
techniques to try. Dellapenna divides these methods into
“injury,” or external manipulation of the pregnant woman’s
body in a way designed to force miscarriage; “ingestion,” the
insertion of pregnancy-destroying substances into the mouth
or vagina; and “intrusion,” the pushing of an object or
implement through the cervix into the uterus.257 All three
categories endangered the pregnant woman. Methods of the
“injury” category caused certain physical trauma.258 Ingestion
methods were almost certainly less effective—and also less
safe, because of risks of overdose.259
Intrusion techniques, featuring the insertion of probes
into the vagina, have the sparsest historical record of the
255. For a satirical expression of this point, see New ‘Anti-Abortion Pill’ Kills
Mother, Leaves Fetus Alive, THE ONION (May 10, 2006), http://www.theonion.com
/article/new-anti-abortion-pill-kills-mother-leaves-fetus-a-1955 (reporting the
invention of a drug called UR-86, “a ‘safe and effective method’ for terminating
pregnant women while leaving their unborn children unharmed”).
256. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 333. Historian John Riddle notes a contrary
view, arguing that until the late Middle Ages, lay people knew how to terminate
pregnancy safely and effectively. See JOHN M. RIDDLE, CONTRACEPTION AND
ABORTION FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE RENAISSANCE 7-10 (1992). He engaged
a pharmacologist from the Boston University School of Medicine to review the
abortifacient properties of the herbs, unguents, and juices he read about.
DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 23. Riddle published his findings first, giving
Dellapenna a chance to refute them. See id. at 23-24. When a science journalist
reviewed the dispute, she noted the lack of evidence that any of these methods
Riddle located could work. See Kolata, supra note 3. Kolata did report that experts
found Riddle’s hypothesis about pre-modern contraception and abortion
“tantalizing.” Id. at C10.
257. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 32-56.
258. Id. at 32.
259. Id. at 37.
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three. Though dangerous because of ignorance about
reproductive anatomy and severe risks of infection, these
methods did launch the modern era wherein a rational
individual would consider terminating her pregnancy.260
Shortly before World War I, abortion by dilatation and
curettage became available.261 This technique, whose
applications go beyond elective abortion, involves opening
the cervix and scraping out the contents of the uterus.262 For
dilatation and curettage to function safely and effectively,
patients and providers needed complementary technologies,
especially anesthesia and antibiotics, which evolved through
the middle of the twentieth century and continue to change.263
The intrusion approach to abortion moved forward with the
development of vacuum aspiration, today the most common
method of terminating pregnancy in the first trimester,264 and
technologies of introducing fluids like saline or prostaglandin
solutions into the uterus.265
Safe and effective ingestion technology also arrived late
in the twentieth century with the emergence of mifepristone
or RU-486, the “abortion pill.”266 In the United States the
abortion pill combines ingestion with intrusion, as patients
return to clinical settings for (intrusive) follow-up
examination.267 Ingestion takes time. Merely swallowing an
abortion pill does not effect an instant termination.

260. Id. at 51-53.
261. Id. at 333.
262. Carol A. Turkington, Dilatation and Curettage, in 2 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA
1183, 1183 (3d ed. 2006).
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263. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 333-34.
264. Obos Abortion Contributors, Aspiration Abortion, OUR BODIES OURSELVES
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/health-info/vacuum-aspirationabortion.
265. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-76 (1976)
(ruling on the constitutionality of a ban on saline amniocentesis as an abortion
technology).
266. JONATHAN EIG, THE BIRTH OF THE PILL: HOW FOUR CRUSADERS REINVENTED
SEX AND LAUNCHED A REVOLUTION 314 (2014) (noting release of RU-486 in France
in 1988 and 2000 in the United States); Winikoff et al., supra note 36.
267. Winikoff et al., supra note 36, at 1304.
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Several conclusions may be drawn from this review of
abortion technology. Foremost among them for our purposes:
abortion as a choice for a pregnant woman is historically new.
It arrived not before 150 years ago, and for most of the United
States population only in the twentieth century. Earlier
times were the age of no choice.
Speaking for myself, I acknowledge having trouble
letting go of the belief that in days of old, persons seeking to
end pregnancy received efficacious therapies from an
unlettered yet sage female network. If a lengthy footnote by
Joseph Dellapenna is any guide, other writers have also been
cherishing this notion.268 Yet there is little reason to think
that abortion was until modern times an option for someone
who intended to survive the experience. Knowledge of female
reproductive anatomy, anesthetics, antibiotics, analgesics,
clean running water, and dissemination of written data have
been essential developments.269
If the best available abortion technology was for most of
human history dangerous and ineffective, then legal
prohibitions of abortion of the past make sense as harm
reduction. Most termination-choosers wish to remain alive
and most societies oppose behaviors and substances that lack
therapeutic benefit and bring a high risk of messy,
unpredictable, and painful death. In this light, to swear “by
Apollo the physician, and Aesculapius, and Health, and Allheal, and all the gods and goddesses” that one will not “give
268. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 18 n.87 (citing thirty-three books, twelve
articles and book chapters, and two Supreme Court amicus briefs as manifesting
the proposition “that women in the past controlled abortion and performed the
procedure routinely, safely, and easily”); see also REAGAN, supra note 7, at 9
(noting ancient uses of juniper and other substances as abortifacients, but not
reporting evidence that anything worked). If pregnant women had had access to
an easy fix—a convenient, safe, cheap, effective way to end their condition without
ending their own lives—then this lost technology would please a large
constituency today, when more than a third of the world’s people live under
national governments that ban or severely restrict abortion and access grows
increasingly difficult in the United States as well. See Emily Bazelon, The PostClinic Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2014, (Magazine), at 22-23.
269. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 333-35; see also Kolata, supra note 3
(quoting a historian who found that gynecological texts from the medieval period
translated from Latin into the vernacular “suppresse[d] the contraceptive
information,” suggesting that “women were not being trusted”).
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to a woman a pessary to produce abortion,” as the all-male
physicians of classical Greece may have sworn,270 becomes
benevolent rather than oppressive—men promising to
refrain from giving a woman something very likely to hurt
her and very unlikely to meet her needs.
Safety-and-effectiveness also explains the hostility to
abortion professed by nineteenth century feminist leaders
like Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a
posture tendentiously remembered by anti-abortion activists
who claim that abortion must be bad for women if even the
legendary feminists of yore frowned on it.271 What these
leaders frowned on, of course, was oppression of women. They
took particular interest in the oppression of unwanted
motherhood. They cherished birth control, with many
arguing “that wives had the right to unilaterally choose when
to engage in sexual relations with their husband, abstaining
periodically or abstaining permanently unless procreation
was desired.”272 When feminists were opposing abortion back
in the middle of the nineteenth century, the best possible
safeguard against unwanted motherhood was an entitlement
to keep semen away from one’s vagina. Iffy contraceptive
technologies of the day took second place. From the
perspective of a woman who valued the integrity of her body,
abortion ranked lower than almost anything.
In hindsight, back in the unsafe-and-ineffective era the
common law did all it could to support the bodily integrity of
pregnant women. Regardless of who is right in the debate
over where common law judges stood on abortion as a
crime,273 unquestionably the common law confined whatever
punishments it doled out to third parties. No application of
the common law of crimes ever punished a woman who
270. Hippocrates, The Oath, INTERNET CLASSICS ARCHIVE, http://classics.mit.edu
/Hippocrates/hippooath.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
271. See Tracy A. Thomas, Misappropriating Women’s History in the Law and
Politics of Abortion, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 3-4, 27 (2012).
272. Id. at 29 (citing historian Linda Gordon).
273. Compare JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: SOME ASPECTS OF
LEGAL REGULATION OF ABORTION IN ENGLAND FROM 1830 TO 1982 3-7 (1988)
(concluding that the common law prohibited abortion, at least after quickening),
with Means, supra note 24 (describing abortion as a “common-law liberty”).
THE

2015]

COMMON LAW OF ABORTION

1197

sought to rid herself of her own pregnancy;274 nineteenth
century maneuvers to make women culpable for abortions
they chose for themselves had to change the common law.275
Moreover, by providing that pregnancy starts with
quickening276—and not other markers like insemination, a
pregnant-looking silhouette, or the visible onset of labor, all
of which would give powers and opportunities to nonpregnant persons—common law regulation of abortion put
foremost that which the pregnant woman felt, thought, and
believed about herself.277
B. Patriarchy
Defined
by
its
leading
historian
as
the
institutionalization of male dominance over women in
society,278 patriarchy has shaped the law in numerous ways.
One dramatic instance of this effect found in the common law
was the rise of coverture as a legal disability. Coverture, as
restated by its great spokesman William Blackstone,
imposed an array of detriments on married women with
respect to their personal property.279 By her entry into
marriage a wife forfeited most of her existence as a legal

274. The seventeenth century Regina v. Webb comes closest. Webb reported, in
French, the indictment of Margaret Webb, who “once ate a certain poison called
‘ratsbane’ with the intention of getting rid of and destroying the child in the womb
of the said Margaret” and “then and there got rid of and destroyed the same child
in her womb.” DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 193 (citing to a translation of the
case). Margaret Webb was never punished for her willful ingesting of ratsbane;
she was promptly pardoned by the general pardon that covered offenses
committed before August 7, 1601. Id. at 194. The general pardon of 1601 did not
extend to murder, see id., which meant that whatever crime Webb was, or could
have been, found guilty of was not understood to be murder.
275. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 298 & n.295 (citing eighteen U.S. statutes
including New York’s misdemeanor, later elevated to a felony).
276. Karen M. Weiler & Katherine Catton, The Unborn Child in Canadian Law,
14 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 643, 645 (1976).
277. REAGAN, supra note 7, at 10 (describing legal reliance on quickening as
“implicitly” respectful of women’s autonomy).
278. GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY app. 238-39 (1986)
(referencing an appendix called Definitions).
279. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
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person, Blackstone wrote.280 She lived under what might be
called “husbandry” in the sense of management and
control281:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law[ ]: that is,
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she
performs every thing[.] . . . [T]hough our law in general considers
man and wife as one person, yet there are some instances in which
she is separately considered; as inferior to him, and acting by his
compulsion. And therefore all deeds executed, and acts done, by
her, during her coverture, are void.282

From there a married woman could not make a contract,
Blackstone added, and could neither sue nor be sued for
personal injury.283 Later writers noted other consequences of
coverture, including a rule that a married woman could
control neither the property she brought into the marriage
nor her wage earnings acquired during the marriage.284 A
husband who wanted to sell her property to pay off his debts
could do so without her consent.285
The Blackstone synthesis, published in 1765, illustrates
how convention and social power affect the interpretation
and functions of the common law. Blackstone read his
English legal history tendentiously.286 Writing as a “new
Tory” and a commoner on the rise in a conservative milieu,
he left out of his Commentaries on the Laws of England
powers that women, married and unmarried alike, had
enjoyed without interference during the common law’s

280. Id.
281. See supra note 15.
282. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442-44.
283. Id. at *442.
284. Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Status Determined Her Legal
Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 L. LIBR.
J. 459, 460-61 (2002).
285. Id.
286. See MARY RITTER BEARD, MAKING WOMEN’S HISTORY: THE ESSENTIAL MARY
RITTER BEARD 181 (Ann J. Lane ed., Feminist Press 2000) (1977).
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heyday.287 His big readership in Britain and the new United
States, finding the Commentaries “easy reading” and
“convincing,”288 drew inferences about the past that they
reproduced going forward.
When the relatively nuanced development that
Blackstone found in the common law hardened into
prescriptions that added new controls over women,
patriarchy proceeded in a familiar path: innovations that
strengthened institutional dominance came in as they often
do, gradually rather than brutally.289 Neither Blackstone nor
his audience had an agenda to take rights or privileges away
from anyone, just as in the war-torn second millennium B.C.,
a woman and a man would have found it convenient rather
than oppressive to share in the surpluses of plow agriculture
by living together under the protection and control of the
man.290 Limits on sexual freedom for a woman in the early
agrarian household, born from new learning about how to
breed livestock, set a base for more comprehensive control of
all her freedoms, just as Blackstone’s collection of detriments
found in coverture went on to beget more detriments.
Substantive and procedural deprivations within
patriarchy built on one another. By denying married women
the opportunity to hold property in their own name and
applying the property rubric to a wealth of good things,
coverture took wealth from women. By removing the
opportunity for women to litigate in their own right,
coverture alienated women from the machinery or
procedures of common law courts. Withdrawal and exclusion
287. See id. at 181-83. One well-documented example of what did not interest
Blackstone is the category of feme sole trader, which permitted a married woman
abandoned by her husband to petition for permission to jettison the constraints
of coverture. See Yvonne Boyer, First Nations Women’s Contributions to Culture
and Community through Canadian Law, in RESTORING THE BALANCE: FIRST
NATIONS WOMEN, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 69, 73, 89 n.21 (Gail Guthrie
Valaskakis et al. eds., 2009).
288. BEARD, supra note 286, at 181.
289. See ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL
LEGACY 70 (3d ed. 2014).
290. LERNER, supra note 278, at 211 (describing how patriarchal dominance
became the norm in Western civilization).
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altered the substance of the common law; deteriorations
made shortfalls of procedure look normal. Rightsconsciousness necessarily dwindled among women and male
domination in law consequently had to increase.
Thus when a nineteenth century denial of a law license
for no reason other than the applicant’s gender made its way
to the Supreme Court, some judges who ruled against the
excluded lawyer sided against her on the procedure-ish
ground that as a married woman she could not make a
contract and all lawyers need contracts to do their work,
whereas other judges reached the same result by concluding
that the Creator did not intend for women to practice law in
His dominion, a substantive judgment.291 Upholding the
denial of a law license on the sole ground that the lawyer was
a woman sent a message of rejection and exclusion to all
women. Restrictions that derived from coverture thus
replicated themselves as they expanded the swath of
deprivation. Being cut off from the courts prevented women
from asserting abortion-related interests as their own legal
entitlements and rights.
In a parallel juridical universe of equal access for all
genders, the decisions that individuals wanted to make about
their pregnancies could have been expressed in terms of selfdefense, property, unjust enrichment, no duty to rescue, and
other concepts that entered the common law through the
writs and rights that venturesome men conceived and
installed. A woman might find invasion of her body and
uncompensated state-compelled beneficence just as odious as
a man does—for all we know, even more.292 Because the
common law disabled most women from owning and
managing property while insisting that persons needed lawbased power to hold and manage property as a condition of
participation in the system, however, the right of a woman to
apply deadly force to an entity located inside her and to
refuse costly sacrifice could not flourish in judicial decisions.
Nobody with power to shape the common law was vulnerable
to invasion by a Zef. If men and women had held access to the
291. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 130-33 (1872).
292. Cf. James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, When are Women More Generous than
Men?, 44 ECON. INQUIRY 587, 588 (2006) (reporting a study showing that women
are more sensitive than men to “the costs of generosity”).

2015]

COMMON LAW OF ABORTION

1201

common law on the same terms, then judges could have
encountered this Article’s thesis against a backdrop of wideranging, familiar common law liberties.
This backdrop might have developed differently if
common law judges knew from the start that the freedoms
they recognized applied to everyone. Condoned self-regard is
a harsh ideology. The pitiless common law—featuring family
members denied bone marrow and left to die, fleeing felons
shot by persons whose lives they did not threaten, refusals to
grant specific performance of promises—might have looked
too mean and severe if women and other subordinated groups
were entitled to dole out its deprivations.293 Condoned selfregard would have been mitigated in another way if women
inherently feel connected to and responsible for other
persons, as scholars have argued,294 and as participants
added their sense of connection to common law doctrine.
We who assess the modern common law cannot know
what a different history would have yielded. We inherited the
jurisprudence we have. The conclusion for present purposes
is straightforward: when they admitted women into this
interlocking system of the common law, extending them
formal equality,295 courts and legislatures recognized
entitlements about invasion and indifference that were
always there and that remain alive.
C. Individualism
In a pattern related to but distinct from the effects of
patriarchy, individualism also obscured the common law
293. See generally Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat:
Stand Your Ground, Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege,
68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (2014) (discussing bias against minorities as well as
women).
294. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 34-35 (1988); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 12-19 (1988); see also Michael W. McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious
Deliberation About Abortion, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1191-92 (1991) (claiming
that “women active in the pro-life movement most commonly see their efforts as
‘a defense of female nurturance against male self-interest’” (quoting feminist
anthropologist Faye Ginsburg)).
295. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 24-26
(1999) (describing the entry of formal equality into American law).
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right to terminate a pregnancy. “Individualism” as used here
means a perspective that seeks to posit out group-based
markers that help to constitute identity. Group memberships
tell us where we belong, what our communications express,
and whom we implicate when we act.
A disinclination to consider parties and litigants as
representatives of larger communities or cohorts pervades all
of the common law. Individualism takes form in bright-line
common law rules—for example, the rejection of group
defamation as a cause of action—and also in tenets that
subordinate contrary interests, for example the common law
ideal of testamentary freedom for someone who possesses
wealth. By contrast, legal concepts that identify groups with
reference to distributive justice owed—hate speech, hate
crimes, intergenerational obligation (not just the
environmental sort, which rests on newer awarenesses, but
even the civil-law idea that ancestors and descendants share
property), social or communal title to land, and group-based
remedies like reparations for wrongs like slavery—have
always been, and remain, foreign to the common law.
Like every legal system, however, the common law has
always classified individuals as members of groups.296 And so
coverture, for example, enforced generalizations about
married men and married women. Estates in land passed
with reference to categories of individuals. The common law
came up with labels for groups, some of which survive, to
signify hierarchies of privilege.297
Individualism in the common law might, at this first
blush, look like crude conservatism overlaid by hypocrisy:
whenever recognition of a group would mean the transfer of
wealth or power, or at least a challenge to existing
distributions, the common law keeps its distance and insists
on regarding each person as an individual. No common law
296. The aggregation of persons into groups lessens the danger of arbitrariness
in the exercise of state power. The rule of law demands that individuals be treated
with reference to the categories they represent.
297. Favored labels in its jurisprudence include invitee, holder in due course,
landlord, and land possessor. Disfavored common law statuses include trespasser,
bastard, and gratuitous bailee. Other roles—mortgagee, licensee, grantee, fellow
servant—advert to detriments and powers that vary depending on what members
of other groups want or assert.
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crime of hate speech, no reparations, no group defamation.
But when recognition of a group affirms the status quo ante—
demeaning children who were born out of wedlock, keeping
land visitors in their place—then the common law embraces
aggregation.
Conservatism-and-hypocrisy may indeed explain the
common law’s selective acceptance of both individualism and
aggregation, but in accounting for how the common law right
to terminate pregnancy fell away from view, I would draw a
narrower inference: individualism, like the gender-based
restrictions noted above, functions in the common law as both
cause and effect. Whether on purpose or by happenstance, it
begat more of itself. Lawyers, judges, jurors, and scholarsynthesizers like Blackstone had several traits in common:
racial identity, apparent sexual orientation, and gender.
Their religion, class, and wealth levels were a bit less
homogenous but not varied enough to stray much from a
prosperous Protestant center.
Variety in these ranks would have altered the common
law. For example, if children could have spoken for
themselves, then themes of dependency and shared
responsibility would have become more overt in its
doctrines.298 Diversity in class and wealth would almost
certainly have altered the common law of land ownership and
use, and might have expanded the category of property to
enlarge rights related to employment, education, or
housing.299 Homogeneity of the persons entitled to hold power
and make decisions meant that the common law did not have
to confront group memberships that might have challenged
its procedures or its substantive commitments.
Once it focused on group membership just enough to
diminish persons based on conditions they had acquired at
birth or by social assignment, the common law could proceed
as if membership in an aggregation derives entirely from
volunteering. Put up your real property as collateral and you
298. See BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY
BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE 6-8 (2008) (noting the
omission).
OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM

299. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 773 (1964)
(arguing that this expansion of property would be consistent with common law
antecedents).
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become a mortgagor. Assume a position of trust and you’re a
fiduciary. The common law did not have to think about
socially constraining group memberships like race, gender,
age, wealth, or religion—conditions that thwarted its
cherished liberties altogether—because its principals did not
have to think about them. Resembling the self-replication of
coverture,300 a blinkered exclusion generated more exclusion.
A legal system that develops this way can attain great
insights and results, but it will fall short of its own ideals
whenever a problem amenable to its regulation is
experienced disproportionately by members of an excluded
group. Insiders complain effectively when they do not get
their due; institutions have trouble hearing the same
protests from persons understood to have little or no voice.
And so the common law, evolving to meet the needs of an
ever-larger population in new locations, did not readily
extend the benefits of doctrine, including the right to
terminate one’s pregnancy, to persons otherwise qualified for
inclusion.
D. The Parallel to Slavery
Women captured in combat, accompanied by their
children, became the first slaves of human history.301 Young
and predominantly female populations could be installed
smoothly into the patriarchal household because in their
appearance and social roles they resembled the wives and
offspring who already lived there. Patriarchy as a
background condition helped enable slavery to take root.
The nineteenth century struggle against chattel slavery
inspired eloquent linkages to coverture. Unjust deprivations
of fundamental rights—to vote, sue, own property, enter into
contracts, and choose one’s employer and employment—
connected otherwise different American experiences.302
Suffragist Angelina Grimké, acknowledging what current
observers might call her privilege, wrote that as a woman she
300. See supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
301. LERNER, supra note 278, at 212-16.
302. See generally AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998).
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was “compelled to drag the chain and wear the collar on my
struggling spirit as truly as the poor slave was on his body.”303
Her adversaries agreed about the resemblance but deemed it
a good rather than a bad thing: both slavery and patriarchy
elevated a male lord to rule over his home and holdings. To
these defenders, both religion and secular government
recognized the necessity of obedience and command in both
slavery and marriage.304
In the contemporary abortion debate, both proponents
and opponents of abortion rights have enlisted American
slavery to support their polar-opposite views. To proponents
of the right to terminate, the Thirteenth Amendment ban on
forced work includes the work of compulsory gestation and
childbearing.305 Opponents of abortion rights for their part
depict the unborn in utero as a counterpart to the slave Dred
Scott, classified by the antebellum Supreme Court as among
“beings of an inferior order” who were “so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.”306 I make a narrower claim here.
Slavery presents an example—multiple examples, it
turns out—of how the common law failed to live by its own
doctrines. Before emancipation, judges had occasions to
consider numerous questions of criminal and civil
responsibility that exposed the incompatibility of the
common law with the demands of law-backed enslavement.
The entire crime of homicide, for example, becomes
incoherent if a victim is deemed a person in some legal
respects but not in others.307 The privilege to beat one’s slave
for no reason may or may not include the privilege to kill
303. Letter from Angelina Grimké to Sarah M. Douglass (Feb. 25, 1838), in 2
LETTERS OF THEODORE DWIGHT WELD, ANGELINA GRIMKÉ WELD, AND SARAH
GRIMKÉ 1822–1844, at 572, 574 (Gilbert H. Barnes & Dwight L. Dumond eds.,
1965) (1934), quoted in Alexander Tsesis, Gender Discrimination and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1661-62 (2012).
304. Tsesis, supra note 303, at 1664.
305. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
306. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
307. See Jenny Bourne Wahl, Legal Constraints on Slave Masters: The Problem
of Social Cost, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 7-8, 7 n.22, 8 n.23 (1997) (noting
inconsistencies in prosecutions of owners who killed their slaves).
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him.308 Other common law crimes also cannot be reconciled
with the classification of human beings as chattel. The
common law typically makes its duties applicable to all
persons uniformly unless their past voluntary conduct
obliged them to do more; for slaves alone judges added ad hoc
constraints, without explanation.309
Tort proved equally confounded by the contradictions
between slavery and the common law. Just as slavery made
the common law crimes of assault, battery, rape, kidnapping
and others harder to punish coherently, the status of
enslavement is necessarily “bursting with an infinite number
of potential torts” not limited to assault, battery, and false
imprisonment.310 When masters leased their slaves out to
hirers who paid these masters for bondage labor, could a
slave and a free man work together in the common law’s
“fellow servant” relationship?311 As a scholar of tort law
concluded, slavery and law “can exist only in a space in which
the other is absent.”312
This incompatibility pervades the common law. Contract
law, for example, forbids the enforcement of any bargain
where one person relinquishes all his rights to another.313 A
slave had no civil remedy for this loss, but in principle the
common law condemned it. As for property, the classification
of human beings as chattel challenged the antebellum
common law to follow the logic of this assertion.314 One
308. Andrew Fede, Toward a Solution of the Slave Law Dilemma: A Critique of
Tushnet’s ‘The American Law of Slavery,’ 2 Law & HIST. REV. 301, 313 (1984).
309. For example, the crime of “‘insolence’ to whites.” Id. at 313.
310. Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1209, 1216-17
(2004).
311. See Ponton v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 245, 246-47
(1858) (ruling yes). One might also wonder whether physical harm to the slave
experienced at a for-hire worksite constituted personal or economic injury.
312. Hylton, supra note 310, at 1219.
313. See EDLIE L. WONG, NEITHER FUGITIVE NOR FREE 41 (2009); see also supra
notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
314. For example, the colonial legislature in Virginia, aware that English
common law provided that “a child, even one born out of wedlock, followed the
status of the father,” Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or
Property?, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO
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property-related complication arose whenever slave owners
tried manumission, the freeing of slaves by testamentary
instrument. Courts in states near the Union border tended to
uphold this provision in a will, but further south, where
industrial businesses had less interest in freed slaves as
workers, this facet of testamentary freedom was too
disruptive to honor.315 Then there was the common law of
evidence, regularly ignored by judges when a master wished
to testify that his slave, on trial for a crime, had an alibi. 316
On and on.
That the common law and slavery do not coherently
coexist is clear, I hope: less obvious is the affirmative obstacle
that the common law posed to slavery. “[T]he common law
vested all people with certain legal rights, so the first step in
the accommodation process” between English common law
and New World slavery “was to legally ‘dehumanize’ slaves
and thereby strip them of [their] common law civil rights.”317
The common law went along with this accommodation, as I
argue pervasively in this Article, because it was blinkered by
skewed membership in its decision-making ranks.
Misunderstandings about who counts obscured what it did
and failed to do.318
My “parallel to slavery,” then, is not the more familiar
comparison of slavery to abortion, nor of slavery to forced
childbearing. Instead slavery functions here as a precedent
for reanimation of the common law. The instance of slavery
demonstrates how the common law neglected its principles
even though the principles were intelligible and
unchallenged. This parallel helps retrieve the abortion right
furnished in the common law because it indicates that even
though the common law does not always honor the
THE CONTEMPORARY

105, 111 (Jean Allain ed., 2012), had to import a Roman law
about livestock to supersede the common law when it wanted to classify the child
of a free father and a slave mother as a slave. Id.
315. See Fede, supra note 308, at 316.
316. Id. at 317-18. The common law rule provided that an interest in the
outcome of the dispute rendered a witness incompetent. Id. at 317.
317. Id. at 312.
318. See supra Part II.B.
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“elementary human rights to personal integrity”319 that it
stands for, these commitments can be rehabilitated.
Emancipation of American slaves restored to human beings
the common law rights they had held all along but that had
lain out of view under the cloud or tarpaulin of
subordination.320 Recognizing the common law right to
terminate one’s pregnancy would enable a similar
restoration.
CONCLUSION
Individuals hold—and as long as the common law has
been in place, they have always held—a legal right to
terminate their pregnancies. Their desire not to be pregnant
is the only reason they need to exercise this common law
right. The entitlement to end one’s pregnancy before the birth
of a child existed in the law of crimes, torts, property,
contracts, and equity, read separately and together, long
before the United States Supreme Court found it in the
Constitution.321
As a state-imposed detriment, prohibition of abortion is
a burden that the law may not force on an individual unless
she earned adversity via her prior voluntary conduct. 322
Nothing about being pregnant against one’s will
demonstrates this desert. Common law doctrines go further
in support of a right to terminate. They unite around
319. Fede, supra note 308, at 309.
320. The great abolitionist Frederick Douglass provided an example when he
wrote about the common law precept of self-defense twisted and mocked by
antebellum law. Justification operated, but in reverse: “Should a slave, when
assaulted, but raise his hand in self-defense, the white assaulting party is fully
justified by southern, or Maryland, public opinion, in shooting the slave down.”
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM 82 (William L. Andrews ed.,
Illini Books 1987) (1855).
321. I include equity in this roster even though it is distinct from the common
law, because equity and law have operated together over centuries in common
law legal systems. See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the
Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083, 2086-87 (2001) (noting that
although the roots of restitution law lie more in courts of law rather than courts
of equity, “restitution and unjust enrichment have often been associated with
equity in a broader sense”).
322. See supra Part II.
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allowing a person to rank herself above everyone else: they
teach what this Article has called condoned self-regard. Selfdefense, defense of others, defense of property, and “the
castle doctrine” maintain that invasion of a person’s body is
a wrong that may be fended off. Non-criminal common law
fields set a default wherein aid to another person is optional,
not mandatory. Thus even if abortion kills a person, which
may not be the case,323 the common law supports this action
at the election of the one who is pregnant. The catchphrase
“pro-choice,” an awkward fit with any constitutional right—
the Constitution says nothing in its text about choice—aptly
describes the common law of abortion.
Volunteering and choice pervade all the common law.
Differing here from statutes and administrative regulations,
the common law expects rights and entitlements to be
asserted by, rather than thrust upon, the persons affected.
As individuals we might have a defense in a criminal
prosecution or civil action; we could have an affirmative civil
claim against another person. We can take these things or
leave them. Whenever we decline opportunities that the
common law gives us, our entitlement fades to the
background. We are free to say no to condoned self-regard.
We may also say yes. Unless our liberty has been limited in
consequence of our prior voluntary conduct or we fulfill the
elements of actus reus and mens rea when we act,324 the
common law condones our self-regard at all times, including
the times that an exploitative life-form grows unwelcome
inside us.

323. This Article has proceeded as if the Zef were equivalent to a person because
this posture derives from its source material: the common law, understanding
rights and wrongs with reference to the interests of an individual, personifies
entities, including corporations and the government. See Orin S. Kerr, How to
Read a Legal Opinion: A Guide for New Law Students, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 51, 52
n.1 (2007) (noting that English case law uses Rex and Regina to name the state
as adversary of a criminal defendant); Dan Tarlock, Why There Should Be No
Restatement of Environmental Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 663, 667-68 (2014)
(observing that the common law cannot protect biodiversity because of its
methodological insistence on “legal personality”). On the compatibility of possible
personhood for the Zef with a strong right to terminate, see Judith Jarvis
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48 (1971).
324. See supra Part II (establishing that pregnancy of itself does not qualify for
either limitation on freedom).
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Doctrines and precepts that inform this Article are
familiar, although readers may disagree with parts of them
or prefer not to see them applied to abortion. The common
law unquestionably does regulate termination-related
behaviors that case law and scholarship have covered so well:
that is, variations on a theme of pushing up against someone
else’s uterus. At the same time—and at a deeper level—it
also recognizes the actions and agendas of the uteruspossessor herself. It will honor her decisions to reject, expel,
decline to help, and, under well-delineated circumstances,
even kill. Rights reaching into the interior of our bodies are
fundamental to the common law.

